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Christianity and Society

The Kingdom and the Sermon on the Mount

Charles Stinnette

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History and the Next Peace

W. Burnet Easton, Jr.

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The Theology of the Malvern Conference

Ronald Preston

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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EDITORIALS

The Race Problem

The evacuation of thousands of American citizens of Japanese parentage from the coastal states of the west in defiance of all their rights of citizenship must be added to the difficulties which negroes are experiencing in the defense forces, as indications of the seriousness of the race problem in the democratic world.

We may resist Hitler's explicit identification of virtue and race particularly when the racial theory redounds to the advantage of a race other than our own. Not despite all democratic pretensions, there is no democracy which has fully transcended racial prejudices. Perhaps we might add that no democracy ever will transcend them completely; though of course no one can place limits upon the possibilities of surmounting them. Which is to say that race pride is one of the many aspects of man's collective life which have been obscured by our contemporary culture. This culture has assumed that pride of race is no more than vestigial remnant of barbarism and that increasing education would overcome it.

Liberal educators are fond of calling attention to the fact that children have no race prejudice; from which they draw the conclusion that nothing but a faulty education is responsible for the prejudice. They fail to recognize that the

same children who have no race prejudice are also completely oblivious to race distinctions as such. It would be analogous if we argued that nothing but a faulty education caused sex aberrations and proved the contention by pointing to the absence of either sex passion or sex consciousness among children. The mistake is to identify childish innocency with virtue and to attribute the corruption of that virtue to some social source of corruption.

Racial prejudice, as every other form of group prejudice, is a concomitant of the collective life of man. Group pride is the sinful corruption of group consciousness. Contempt of another group is the pathetic form which respect for our own group frequently takes. We must not condone these sinful corruptions, but we need not condone them if we discover that they are more inevitable and perennial than modern idealists have assumed. But a profounder study of the tragedy of collective sin will make us less confident of the various panaceas which are intended to eliminate such sin in its various manifestations.

The liberal church which has assumed that the right kind of religious education would eliminate race prejudice might well engage in some contrite reflection upon the fact that liberal

churches have not become inter-racial by force of their educational program; and that there are not a half-dozen churches in our whole nation that have transcended race pride in their corporate life to any considerable degree.

The more orthodox sacramental churches, which make a sharp distinction between what is possible in an ordinary human community and what is possible in a sacramental community of grace, have actually achieved a greater degree of transcendence over race than the liberal churches, which have assumed that "natural" man has the capacity to rise above race pride and prejudice, if only he becomes a little more enlightened.

There are, in other words, no solutions for the race problem on any level, if it is not realized that there is no absolute solution for this problem. There is no absolute solution in the sense that it is not possible to purge man completely of the sinful concomitant of group pride in his collective life.

If we understood the depth of this problem, we would not be so ready to attribute the evacuation of the Japanese from the coastal areas to the war emergency and to the lack of loyalty to our institutions among them. We would know that there are undoubtedly disloyal Japanese of the first generation, and that there may be a few in the second generation of American citizens. But we would also know that the inclination to place them all in the same category is not justified by the facts. It is prompted by the inveterate tendency among men to generalize about individuals in another group upon the basis of the least favorable evidence in regard to them. We cannot deal with our injustices to either the Negroes or the Japan-

ese adequately because we dare not confess to ourselves how great our sins are. If we made such a confession, the whole temple of our illusions would fall.

On the side of the minority groups a little more Christian realism would also have its advantages. Negroes for instance tend to resist the achievement of equal rights in the army, if this means the organization of separate units for them. This policy spells segregation for them. They demand equality in mixed units and would rather have their demands denied than to compromise with their principles. Furthermore, they persist in the illusion that the difficulties which they face are caused by the particular prejudices of, let us say, southern army and naval officers. Why have they not yet learned that race prejudice is a deeper disease than that? A particular culture may aggravate it, but the purest democratic culture does not eliminate it. Even if they become more realistic and attribute the sin to all white men, they would still be wrong if they did not understand that all men, and not merely white men, have race prejudice.

One salutary form of religious realism is to brush aside all illusions which have hitherto saved us from cynicism and despair, to allow the facts about human nature to become fully revealed, until all men, including ourselves, are included in the disclosure. Once we have recognized that we ourselves are not free of the sin which we see in our enemy and oppressor, no matter how grievous the oppression, it becomes possible for us to deal with the sin with vigor and with grace.

This does not mean that we ought to capitulate to aggravated forms of evil, merely because we know ourselves to be tainted with them. We may deal with

more resolutely if we fully understand the situation. We can also deal with specific problems more wisely. If we imagine that race pride is only a residual remnant of barbarism, which civilization is in the process of sloughing off, if we do not understand it as a perennial corruption of man's collective mind on every level of social and moral development, we are bound to follow wrong policies in dealing with specific aspects of the problem. An engineer, who dammed up an ocean inlet under the illusion that he was dealing with a mountain stream, would be no more foolish than our social engineers who are constantly underestimating the force and the character of the social stuff which they are manipulating.

The Pope and God

In a statement made on May 13th the Pope declared: "We take the opportunity to speak once again a word of peace and we speak that word in the full consciousness of our absolute impartiality toward all the belligerents and without partial affection for all peoples without exception."

This statement perfectly illustrates the difficulties in which mere men involve themselves when they seek to usurp divine prerogatives. The Pope regards himself as the Vicar of Christ. This eminence quite obviously requires something more than simple belligerency. God is certainly not a simple partisan of any side in any struggle for there are no historic struggles which represent pure virtue in conflict with pure evil. The transcendence of God represents a transcendence of both judgment and mercy in which the historic distinctions between good and evil are taken into account but not absolutely. But the

transcendence of God is not a position that any man can take.

It is possible and necessary for those who know something about God and about the vanity of all human ambitions, to hold to their own position with some sense of humility. Christians must know that there is a judgment beyond their judgment. But they cannot know exactly what the judgment is. If men pretend to rise to the position of God, they have no alternative but to substitute neutrality for belligerency. That may be a more immoral position than belligerency for it effaces the moral distinctions in historic struggles which may be very important.

We wonder what the Pope thinks in the secret of his heart about the compatibility of his avowal of absolute impartiality and his frequent strictures against totalitarianism. That dilemma is inevitable for mere men who play as if they were God.

The similarity between the Pope's position and the effort of a certain kind of moralistic Protestantism to achieve absolute neutrality is instructive. It proves the contention of Reformation critics of both Catholicism and liberalism, when they claim that the two are brothers under the skin, whatever superficial differences may separate them. In both cases the ambiguities of history are not understood, and it is not realized that all men must remain involved in these ambiguities. Neutrality is no escape from human finiteness and sin. Whether we take sides, or refuse to take sides, we do not have enough wisdom to do full justice to the complexities of the issues in which we become involved.

We can only make the best possible judgment in our situation and know that

neither are our judgments absolute, nor can our actions be as equivocal as our judgments. For we are quite able to realize that no cause is good enough to deserve absolute devotion, but also that actions must be more absolute than our judgments. For judgments can take account of the mixture of evil in the cause we support and the mixture of justice in the cause we oppose. But actions are more unequivocal. Either we must defeat a foe, or we must take a neutral position and decide that the issue between contending parties is not important. If the issue is historically important, the position of neutrality may be more immoral than partisanship.

There is, in other words, no way for mere man, whether he be Pope or merely the editor of a Protestant journal, of usurping the position of the divine and of jumping out of the struggles and partisanship of history. Or at least there is no way of doing it without increasing the moral perplexities which these God-men seek to avoid.

Plans for World Organization

The plans for world organization fall into two general categories. One category consists of those planners who are trying to devise the most ideal possible solution for the problem of international anarchy. The other school, which might be termed the realists, consists of those who walk warily and seek to define a possible next step in world organization.

The virtues and vices of these two schools of thought on international affairs are instructive for an understanding of all social and political problems. For the realists are on the whole too pessimistic about the possibility of achieving a genuinely new development in world

organization, and the idealists are too optimistic.

The idealists at their worst imagine that an ideal system of international law would solve the international problem. Professor Niemeyer's "Law Without Force" is a good example of this kind of rationalism, which assumes that nothing but faulty concepts of international law have brought us to our present estate. They do not understand that history is a realm of conflicting vitalities and interests, and that ideas are merely the conceptual embodiment of these vitalities. We do not tame the self-interest of nations by writing new international laws which limit the sovereignty of nations. At their best the idealists know that the problem of international organization is something more than a problem of law. It is the problem of power: The question is how preponderant power is to be organized internationally and how it is to bring partial and subordinate national forces under its control. The second class of idealists understand this fact. But they tend to create some new international power in perfectly abstract and non-historical terms. They would have a federation of the world and a federation of Europe by act of some ideal constitutional convention of the world, and then they would ask every nation to submit itself to this new international authority. It is, of course, not likely that, if nations were asked to abridge their sovereignty and submit themselves to an international authority in terms of such a pure act of will as this idea assumes, that any nation would ever meet the challenge of the world situation.

The realists understand that the organization of the world is, as every political problem, a question of the manipulation of power. They know that world

organization does not get rid of "power politics," but rather that it faces us with the most tremendous task of organizing power on a world scale, so that the conflict of competing national power on the one hand, and the tyranny of irresponsible world power on the other hand will be avoided.

The realists are usually also historical in their method of approach. They know that history moves organically. They would like to use such instruments and attitudes of mutuality as have been fashioned under the pressure of the war emergency and make them the basis of new constitutional arrangements on a world scale. They believe that nations should refuse to accept new responsibilities in cold blood, but that they might be tempted to preserve responsibilities which they have already accepted.

On the whole, history actually moves in the forms and channels suggested by the realists. But the question is whether we understand the radical character of the world crisis sufficiently. Their weakness is that, at best, they would govern the world by a new version of Anglo-American imperialism. If their maximal plans do not rise above imperialism, their minimal plans do not rise above the old balance of power. Certainly in the most delicately poised balance of power will not make an economically interdependent world safe. Professor Lykman's brilliantly conceived analysis of world problems, "America and World Strategy," goes furthest in its analysis of power problems which the federalists never consider. But it is also most pessimistic in discouraging any new venture in world organization.

It is, of course, a simple thing to point out particular mistakes in the past decades which caused the precarious balances of

power in various parts of the world to break down. But these particular mistakes are inevitable. A balance of power is always precarious. The business of government is to construct and reconstruct, to form and reform the equipoise of social forces in any given realm subject to its organization, so that conflict will be avoided as much as possible. If this can not be done in minimal terms on a world scale, our technical international society cannot be made sufferable.

If we are to have a decent peace, we must learn to combine the insights of the realists and the idealists. The problem is more difficult than the idealists imagine. But it is not as insoluble as the realists claim.

Russia and the Western World

It is now quite obvious that if the war against the Axis is won, Russian resistance will have had much to do with the result. Even now we hold our breath, when we hear of developments on the Russian front. For we know that if Russia should be unable to hold firm, the war would either be lost or victory would at least be postponed many years.

There can no longer be any question that history has thrown us into the most fateful comradeship of arms with Russia. The question is what kind of comradeship can be established after the war is over? In answering that question we share neither the fears of those who believe that there is no possibility of working out an accord between Russia and the western world, nor the hopes of those who think the difference between us and Russia is a very slight one and that historical forces will soon overcome it.

We fear Russia and Russia fears us partly because the democratic world is still capitalistic and Russia has abolished

private property. All classes in western society, which fear the abolition of property, are, therefore, bound to look at Russian power with apprehension. But we also fear Russia because we are democratic and Russia is totalitarian. It is well to qualify the uneasy conscience of the western world, because of the presence of capitalistic injustices in our life, with the realization of the fact that Russian experience has proved the danger of a mere merging of political and economic power in the so called abolition of private property. There are some forms of justice in the capitalistic world which are derived from the competition between economic and political power, which have been lost in Russia.

The discovery that the abolition of private property does not of itself guarantee justice thus prompts democratic idealism to support other less disinterested scruples in the western world in regard to communism. There is in short little possibility of the western world becoming communistic short of a complete breakdown of its life. The chasm between us and Russia will not be bridged by our acceptance of the Russian creed, however tortuous may be the process by which we will seek to achieve a higher justice in a technical age.

There is, on the other hand, as little likelihood of the conversion of Russia to democracy. There is a possibility that Russia will in time accept the Christian religion; but in the opinion of Professor Fedotov it would in that event domesticate Christianity within a general scheme of totalitarianism, a consummation not much preferable to its present estate.

The real fact is that we will have to learn the same lesson which Catholic and Protestant nations had to learn after the

thirty-years' war. We will have to learn that history does not move with perfect logic or perfect consistency. The truth embodied in Protestantism was unable to overcome the truth embodied in Catholicism. Without seeking to answer which side had the greatest embodiment of truth, it was simply a fact that neither the one nor the other was able to prevail absolutely. Nations embodying various cultures had to learn to live together. We will have to learn to come to terms with Russia though it has some virtues which threaten our vices and also embodies some vices which threaten our virtues.

We will learn to do this with less disillusionment if we do not expect a too sudden exchange of spiritual and political virtues in such a way that we will accept everything that is good in Russia while Russia in turn embraces the democratic virtues. A real comradeship in an international community will, no doubt, prompt some interchange of cultural and spiritual values. Only we must not expect history to move with a fine and discerning precision in these matters.

It is true, of course, that a government which is not amenable to democratic control is a more difficult partner in international affairs than one which is. But at this point we will have to make distinction between types of totalitarianism and recognize that, whatever the perils of Russian totalitarianism, communism is an essentially universalistic doctrine and it never glorified a single race or nation as the source of all power. Nor did it ever make force self-justifying as the Nazis did. There are many kinds of totalitarianism and there are many shades of democratic justice. We do not embody democratic justice perfectly; nor is it true that all forms of totalitarianism are equally dangerous. The real

It is that there is a greater distinction between a civilization which is based upon order and tyranny, than between democracy and dictatorship. We will have to deal with many nations in the future which are not democratic. It will be possible to do so if these nations have some sort of a rule of law. Only nations and political systems which glorify power without law and self-interest, without mutual restraint, are anti-social in their very structure.

Nothing But the Truth

One of the profoundest self-revelations of modern man is his unwillingness to face the truth about man and history, despite his avowal of loyalty to the truth. Apparently modern culture rests upon devotion to the truth and nothing but the truth. It is truth not dogma, truth not superstition, truth not tradition which is the god of modern culture, according to its explicit avowals.

It wants an unfettered mind to search for the truth. It asks the community to refrain from interference so that the solar may search for the truth. It's "truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God" which the modern man pretends to be seeking.

But if a modern man is approached with the suggestion that the mind is not as pure as he has assumed, that hidden dishonesties lurk in the darkness of what he calls ignorance, that the passions of city and nation do not yield as easily to universal loyalties as he had believed, that history does not move toward the triumph of the good as inexorably as he thinks; if he is approached with any of these or similar suggestions which challenge his characteristic credos he makes a very curious response to them. He does not say: let us analyze the

human situation to see if this doctrine of man or of history is truer than the one we have believed. He insists rather, that it might enervate human courage to believe such things. Or, he asks plaintively whether it might not be detrimental to human self-esteem to question the goodness of either the human mind or of man's primeval nature.

A modern educator, challenged in his interpretation of history, said very simply: the idea of progress is basic to modern education. If that goes, there is no basis for our whole educational program. A medieval monk, challenged on a basic doctrine of his faith, could not have done better.

The refusal of modern culture to re-examine its basic presuppositions obviously makes nonsense of its claims that it is a presuppositionless culture, which is ready at all times to reexamine any of its conclusions. Some of its conclusions are not conclusions at all, but basic presuppositions. They have not been arrived at by examining the data of life and history. Life and history have been examined with these presuppositions as principles of interpretation. Principles of interpretation, determine what is discovered in any series of observation to a much larger degree than a scientific culture is willing to admit. These principles are the keystone of the arch in any modern system of values. That is why modern people cease to be cool and objective when these dogmas are challenged. They are defended with the greater zeal because they are not supposed to be dogmas but merely hypotheses, tentatively held by very scientifically-minded people intent upon discovering the "truth."

There is an even profounder reason why modern men cease to be "objective"

when the goodness of man and the security of history is challenged. These dogmas have given security merely because they are dogmas. But they have also given a certain security because of the peculiar content of the dogmas. They express modern man's religion of self-reliance. He presumably needs no ultimate source and end of life, or source and end of life's meaning. He has the meaning of life within himself, and the guarantee of its fulfillment in his history.

If all this should not be true, man would be faced with despair. He might, of course, find God and be saved of despair. But the ultimate security which the faithful find in the knowledge of God, cannot be reached without going through the insecurity of God's judgment. It is, therefore, safer to believe in the self than in God, for the self does not judge the self severely. "I know nothing against myself" is the comfortable verdict of all devotees of the religion of self-reliance. Of course, we do know a few things against ourselves. But since it is we who know them, this proves that the self which knows cannot be evil, whatever it may say of the self which is known. There is, therefore, no serious judgment in any humanistic religion. The securities of such a religion may be bogus, but at any rate, they allow us to escape the sense of ultimate judgment and to retain our good opinion of ourselves.

That is what these modern devotees of the "truth" fight for so desperately when they flee from the truth which threatens both their immediate and their ultimate security.

Taxation and Inflation

The fight against inflation represents an interesting conflict between ethical

and economic considerations. The lowering of income tax exemptions to \$600 for a single person is not meant primarily to produce revenue but to restrict the consumption capacity of the lower income brackets. That also is the purpose of the sales tax proposal, which the administration opposes and for which it has substituted the more rigorous income tax plan.

The primary problem in the avoidance of inflation is to reduce consumption capacity, and this capacity lies with the millions who do not have large incomes rather than with the few who have. The restrictions upon luxurious expenditures of the wealthy is ethically important, but does not bulk large in the avoidance of inflation.

The effort of the conservatives to prevent a more rigorous taxation of the wealthy on the ground that the rich do not spend enough to aggravate inflation is, therefore, beside the point. Heavy taxation of the wealthy is merely a necessary socio-ethical counterpart to the socio-economic necessity of taxing the poor rigorously. Without it the moral authority of the taxation program breaks down.

The proposal of the administration to abrogate the tax exemption of all state and municipal securities unfortunately is meeting resistance in congress and probably will be defeated. The argument against it is that it breaks faith with those who bought the securities because they were tax exempt. The argument is not very convincing. War emergencies break faith with many people, including all the millions of young men, who had not expected to go into the army. Tax exempt securities are a complete irrationality in any just system of taxation. In effect they

represent a yield of three and four times
an ordinary yield, to those who avoid
the surtaxes through them.

Thank You

We want to express our gratitude to
many readers who have helped us

during the past month in sending us the
names of prospective subscribers. We
are making real progress in extending
the influence of our quarterly and in
winning new subscribers. We hope that
we may continue to have the support of
our readers in this venture.



A PRAYER

Almighty God, who art the sovereign
of history, before whose Majesty, the
fate of nations, the glory of empires
and the prestige of rulers is but a little
thing, give us grace to submit our tasks,
ambitions and aspirations to the dis-
posal of Thy will. Thou hast entrusted
our nation, together with many other
peoples, with an historic mission in this
eventful hour of the world's history. Thou
hast called us to resist tyranny and to
build a community of nations. Help us
that we may not fail in either task.
Give us courage and resolution to per-
form the first task, and wisdom and pa-

tience to perform the second.

Since those against whom we must
now contend in battle, must finally be
brought into a common community,
lest we destroy each other by continual
strife, grant us the spirit of charity to-
ward them, even as we oppose them
resolutely, so that pride and vindictive-
ness may not corrupt the victory for
which we pray. Let Thy Majesty and
not ours be established, that men may
live peaceably with one another because
they have each learned to submit them-
selves to Thy Will, through Jesus Christ
our Lord. Amen.

THE KINGDOM AND THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT

By CHARLES STINETTE

I.

Like the ancient Psalmist, the modern Christian is haunted by a question concerning his most cherished hope, "Where now is your Kingdom?" The brutalities of the present conflict rise like troubled dreams before that Christian who only yesterday confidently looked for the coming of God's Kingdom in this generation. That Kingdom has been postponed. The simple virtues described in the Sermon on the Mount as being characteristic of those who possess the Kingdom are hardly the universal virtues of this generation. Christians are forced to the realization that the Kingdom of God remains a hope — a hope which cannot be anticipated before its time. Perhaps the reason for our frustration lies in our literal and uncritical acceptance of the Kingdom of God as a future structure as did a character in a recent English novel who finished every political speech with the prediction that with a victory for the Labor Party man could "build God's Kingdom in England's green and pleasant land." Could it be that peace has been denied the present generation because it too easily imagined that the Kingdom of God would crown its peace negotiations after the last war? God has a way of dispossessing those who possess, of denying those who think that their righteousness has been established once and for all.

On the other hand, the Sermon on the Mount is a warning to those who

would interpret all life as relative and who would make every decision a matter of expediency. The Kingdom and the Sermon on the Mount are related in that in every decision involving action, the Kingdom of God impinges upon the choice. Christian ethics exert a pressure upon all life including the social structure. The fact that, no social structure could ever fully incorporate the Christian ethic, makes its demands no less absolute nor uncompromising. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus recognized the Kingdom as existing among those who seek after God and his righteousness first and who were not involved in the constraining loyalties of this world. The Kingdom and the commands in the Sermon are inextricably related. An exposition of either is impossible without a consideration of both. Those who would extract and compare the Christian ethic with some other system of ethics miss the point that every command in the ethic is related to the Kingdom. In that fact lies the key to new hope which the Kingdom and the Sermon on the Mount holds for all of us and especially for those whose dreams of the Kingdom of God have been frustrated.

II.

The Kingdom of God is at Hand.

"Now after John was delivered up, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of God, and saying, the time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe in the

spel." (Mark 1:14, 15.) When Jesus appeared in Galilee announcing that the decisive hour was at hand, his listeners knew what he was talking about. The Jewish belief in the coming Kingdom had its roots in the Old Testament. It is always associated with judgment and purification, the day of the Lord, or the Day of Judgment. From Daniel we learn that Judgment precedes the coming of the perfect Kingdom. That Kingdom was conceived as spiritual, holy, just, and above all, just. The belief in the coming Kingdom found its way into current apocalyptic writings and undoubtedly into the hearts of the common people who looked for a better day. John the Baptist adopted this hope as the keynote of his message. Repentance is the necessary requisite for entrance into the coming Kingdom. It was to be a day of divine purification, of "casting into the fire" those who brought not forth "fruits worthy of repentance." John declared that "even now the axe is laid at the root of the trees." And Jesus came after John. He took up John's message. But what had been with John a message of fearful judgment, with Jesus became the proclamation of good tidings. "Believe in the Gospel," he added as he announced the coming Kingdom. The Sermon on the Mount is further evidence of the joyous good news. It combines the urgency of the imminent Kingdom with the single-hearted devotion of those "little ones" who hung on to the very words of the Master wherever he went.

"The Kingdom of God is at hand!" said Jesus as he went about preaching the Gospel. The nearness and the decisiveness of Israel's hope had been evidenced in John's message. As Russell Bowie says, this message "came to the ears of

Jesus like a bell striking the decisive hour." The conviction, that God was about to enter into the affairs of man to fulfill His purpose, pervades all that Jesus said and did. The "time" had been fulfilled. God's Kingdom was about to come. The call to repentance, the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount and the hope of the world, depended upon the imminence and the urgency of this message.

The nearness of the eschaton stands back of the proclamation of the Kingdom. It enhanced the urgency and meaningfulness of every moment between that time and the end. In this fact lies the eschatological significance of time, in the New Testament and today. Every moment has decisive significance in the view that its ultimate consummation will bring in the Kingdom. Of course, such an idea did not occur to the New Testament Christians. It seems to have been generally believed that Christians who had heard the Master would not "go to sleep" before the coming of the catastrophic events which accompanied the end. The fact that passing years forced the Christians to alter their ideas as to when the kingdom would come, does not remove the urgency which the *coming Kingdom* lends to time. Jesus always regarded the eschaton as that imminent and critical reality which in the near future would fulfill and complete his message. It seems to me that the "realized eschatology" of the New Testament is to be found in the evangelists, and not in the Master.

The nearness of the Kingdom is an essential factor in understanding and appreciating the Sermon on the Mount. It stands back of every imperative—it confirms every beatitude. Indeed, the

proclamation method employed in the Sermon lends weight to the *coming Kingdom*. For in the Sermon it is seen that the Kingdom is not just some future hope but is *at hand* and has decisive bearing upon every decision and every act! The radicalness of the Sermon on the Mount is the measure of the nearness of the Kingdom. The imminent Kingdom makes it evident that Jesus came first, not as teacher but as ambassador. In the words of Martin Dibelius, "He proclaimed something, he demanded something, he promised something, but without any human intermediation."

III.

Seek Ye First His Kingdom and His Righteousness

"But seek ye first his Kingdom and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you." (Matt. 6:33) We turn now to a consideration of the relation of the radical demands of the Sermon to the Kingdom. This relation is summed up in the closing words of the section on worldly anxieties (Matt. 6:19-34), where the primacy of God's will is set forth as the motivating drive of all life. Martin Dibelius, after removing later elements, paraphrases this section as follows:

"'Be not anxious for food, be not anxious for clothing. Look at the ravens, how they live, consider the lilies, how they grow—they are not anxious, God provides for them. Do not care for such things, but only for God's Kingdom, and all these things shall be added unto you.'" It is evident that this demand upon the undivided devotion is weighted by the imminence of the Kingdom. Men are to seek God's Kingdom and nothing else! The urgency of

the time makes all other seeking meaningless. Seek first his Kingdom and his righteousness.

This note distinguishes the teaching of Jesus from other ethical systems. He did not come as the prophet of human happiness. The Sermon on the Mount cannot be regarded as a set of rules conceived in such a way that, if followed, will bring happiness. The ethic of Jesus is summed up in this word of seeking first *God's Kingdom and God's righteousness*. Jesus came as the prophet of the "Pure will of God." Christian ethics and the experience of faith in God are inseparable. Theodore Robinson has made the significant remark that, "The most dangerous phenomenon in history has been the attempt to apply the Christian ethic without the Christian experience."

To seek first God's Kingdom is to put the will of God before every other consideration in life. Worldly anxieties stand between God and man. We have said that this absolute command is eschatologically conceived, i.e., viewed in the light of the imminent Kingdom. We must answer the question then whether the command is applicable only to the period between its announcement by Jesus and the end of the world (interim ethic), or is it an expression of God's demands upon men at all times and for all time. As we have said before with regard to the coming of the Kingdom, the eschatological element lends urgency and decisive quality to every moment and every decision, including the decision to seek first God's will. This shortness-of-time cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, the very nature of the command to put the will of God first, presupposes that the will of God suffers no restrictions. The primacy of God's

is no "interimethic." It is an imitative which applies in every moment of history and in every decision of man.

But someone may suggest that perhaps the word *righteousness* qualifies the love of God. Is it not possible to seek righteousness as a practical fulfillment of the command? We must remind ourselves that it is "*his Kingdom and his righteousness*" which we are to seek first. And further, a study of the word *righteousness* reveals that it can only be conceived in terms of a manifestation of righteous purpose. C. H. Dodd has said the following in discussing the meaning of the word righteousness:

In all probability the familiar beatitude, 'Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness', contains the same meaning (above). For an English reader, as for a Greek reader, of the Gospels that suggests, 'those who earnestly desire to be good'; but, in accordance with the Old Testament usage, the original Aramaic beatitude would naturally mean, 'Blessed are they who earnestly desire the vindication of right, the triumph of the good cause.' The word "God's righteousness," therefore, would mean the manifestation of God's righteous will. The Sermon on the Mount answers the *why* of moral conduct before it begins to set forth the standards of that conduct and in doing so points to the primacy of God's will as the motivating force behind God's Kingdom.

IV.

Blessed Are Ye.

We have been speaking of the primacy of God's will. We turn now to the beatitudes as examples of the manifestation

of this will. The *pure in heart* are those who in truth seek first God's Kingdom and righteousness. The *blessed* state which characterizes these real possessors of the Kingdom connotes sharing in the joy of God. The *mourners* are those who are homesick for the Kingdom. In fact, the beatitudes as a whole are simply a positive way of saying, "Blessed are ye who seek God's Kingdom and God's righteousness first." It was in these "little ones" that the *coming Kingdom* found a ready response. That Kingdom already existed in the single hearted devotion of these Kingdom-seekers. They made up the "multitudes" who followed Jesus to the mountain-side.

It is evident that the ethical demands which are laid upon the Kingdom-seekers in the Sermon on the Mount are as absolute and uncompromising as the prior devotion to the will of God. As in the case of the sovereign will of God, so in ethical conduct, there is to be no accommodation to worldly affairs. The Sermon on the Mount can hardly be regarded as a complete system of Christian law which anticipates any situation. It is not law. That it has been regarded as law can be laid to later interpreters. In the Sermon Jesus set forth the "pure will of God." His ethical demands were equally absolute. Indeed, even if not original in text, the verse which closes the section comparing the righteousness of Jesus with the Law, is original and genuine in thought: "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."

The nature of the new righteousness proclaimed by Jesus is further characterized by comparison with the Law. We must not forget that the imperatives of the Sermon on the Mount are conceived in terms of the coming Kingdom. We

That Ye May Be Sons

do not need to point out that the Law was formulated on the basis of a stabilized society. Now I do not mean to say that the Sermon on the Mount *righteousness* is dependent upon the shortness of time. It is the *righteousness* demanded by the eternal God and thus is eternally valid. What I do mean to say is that the nearness of the Kingdom places urgent and inescapable demands upon men in the world. These demands cannot be anticipated by a body of law. It follows that Jesus was not concerned to replace the Law. His interest was not in the Law but in the intention and purpose—the *will* which preceded the Law.

It seems fairly certain that Jesus' attitude toward the observances of the Law is summed up in his word to his followers in Matthew 23:2: "The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat: all things therefore whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe: but do not ye after their works; for they say and do not." Add to this, the warning given by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and it is clear that Jesus' intention is the will of God beyond and deeper than the Law. "For I say unto you, that except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of heaven." (Matt. 5:20) Those who would be the children of the coming Kingdom must consider more than the legal requirements of the Law. These things concerned, the scribes and Pharisees. In the words of Martin Dibelius, "They must recognize what is the full intention of God, His pure and absolute will." Thus also is the requirement of all those who would know the joyous *blessedness* which is the mark of that coming Kingdom. They must think and live and move in the mind of God.

"Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." (Matt. 5:44, 45) We come to the heart of the Sermon on the Mount. Here the pure will of God is made the motivation for the absolute and uncompromised ethic. Here the demand of the new righteousness is seen in its most radical form. And here religion and ethics are united to the common purpose *that one might be a son of God*.

This commandment to love one's enemies puts the will of God in its most radical form. The measure of its radicalness is to be found in its one reward *that ye may be Sons*, for God is impartial to the just and the unjust, as far as worldly reward is concerned. This utter radicalism of the Sermon on the Mount is what Reinhold Niebuhr calls a necessary "touch of madness" in life. "Without the touch of madness," he writes, "all ethical life governed by reason sinks deeply into common sense and therefore it degenerates more and more into an enlightened self-interest, a prudent selfishness."

The commandment to love one's enemies presents the radical demand of the will of God in its most comprehensive form. It is an example of what God requires of man. At the same time, it sets forth the only means whereby it can be realized, *by becoming in truth the Sons of God*. The commandment itself is evidence of the nearness of the Kingdom. Its fulfillment hovers on the

threshold of man's will. It is seen from that the appeal of Jesus is from an effective criterion—the imminent Kingdom. The coming Kingdom presses on man's will not as a choice of man's desire but as the radical imperative of God's will. William Manson rejects the idea of a "general influence of eschatology" on the mind of Jesus as he stated the motivation of His ethical demands. Manson writes as follows, "Take, for example, the principle of loving enemies."

We are to love our enemies, not because the time is short, but because of the loving-kindness of our Father in heaven endureth forever." While it is true that we are not to love our enemies because the time is short, but because the eternal Father wills it, it is equally true that the eternal Father *wills to enter into* human affairs and to establish his Kingdom among men. Christ made this clear in all of his teaching. The *coming Kingdom* is inseparable from the *pure will of God*. Therefore, the demands of God's Kingdom carry the impetus of God's apocalyptic Kingdom.

The ethical demands of Jesus are radical and absolute. There is no such thing as the adaptation of these demands to the consideration of human necessities. They relate to the realm of God where the law of love is absolute. As Claude Royden has written in a recent discussion of the Sermon on the Mount, and particularly of the commandment of love one's enemies, "This is not simply a condemnation of a barbarous standard of ethics. It is a call to go forward from a good standard to an ideal one." And Reinhold Niebuhr has added that it is foolish to try to reduce the absolute ethic so that it will cover and justify our prudential and relative standards and policies." He writes, "The significance

of the law of love is precisely that it is not just another law."

VI.

The Kingdom is Within You

Vs.

My Kingdom Is Not of This World

"Neither shall they say, Lo, here! or, There! for lo, the Kingdom of God is within you (or, in the midst of you)." (Lk. 17;21) "Jesus answers, my Kingdom is not of this world." (John 18;36) The relation of these two verses reveals the twofold nature of the Kingdom. It is already present "in the midst" of those who hear and heed its commands, but its full manifestation "is not of this world." The Kingdom in the Sermon on the Mount comes to grips with history but the fact that its manifestation is "not of this world" is a guard against the historical delusions of this world. The imminent Kingdom will come in and through the will of God and in and through those who heed God's will, but it will not come through the efforts of man to "bring in the Kingdom."

William Manson has written that, "The Jesus of the Gospels not only preaches but inaugurates the Kingdom." Perhaps the presence of the Kingdom in the world can best be explained by calling it the *reign of Christ*. The Kingdom is present wherever Christ rules in the hearts of men. St. Paul knew this presence when he wrote, "The Kingdom of God is not in word but in power." (I. Cor. 4:20). Thus those who wish to live in the Kingdom even now must order their lives in terms of God's will. That will maintains that love, not selfishness, is the ultimate law of life. Obedience to that will establishes the Kingdom of God "in the midst" of men. This is the mean-

ing of St. Augustine's *City of God* when he wrote:

"Two loves have created these two cities, namely, self-love to the extent of despising God, the earthly; love of God to the extent of despising one's self, the heavenly city. The former glories in itself, the latter in God."

We have said that the Kingdom "in the midst" of the world comes to grips with history. That is the function of the Sermon on the Mount. It demands action in obedience to the will of God. Martin Dibelius regards the existence of God's demands in the world as "signs" of the Kingdom, judging as well as blessing us. He writes, "The radicalism of the Sermon on the Mount is our judgment, its announcement of another world is our hope." The law of love in the Sermon on the Mount makes it clear that the Kingdom is not of *this world*. The Sermon is a picture of what this world ought to be. Every decision and every act stands under its judgment. It is a conviction to man of his sin. The Kingdom which it predicated "is always in this world," as Reinhold Niebuhr writes, "in man's uneasy conscience."

The Kingdom of God is in the world but not of it. To enter into it now means to accept the will of God as the rule of life. Archibald Robertson sums up the two-fold nature of the Kingdom in the following words:

"The Kingdom of God, as our Lord preaches it, is at once present and future, to be received now, to be entered into hereafter, at once actual and ideal."

VII.

Thy Kingdom Come!

We have thus far discussed the relation of the Kingdom to the absolute de-

mands which Jesus set forth in the Sermon on the Mount. We must note briefly how the early Christians regarded the Kingdom and the Sermon on the Mount and its meaning for us today. Thus far we have endeavored to discover the absolute and radical claims of the Sermon in relation to the Kingdom. But we know that the early Christians struggled to adapt these absolute claims to life. Matthew represents this tendency. It was a natural process. It began with Paul who felt that the Kingdom existed wherever the Spirit of God was manifest. It continued in the early Church when it experienced the power of the Spirit and the members met together as "changed-individuals." It was only natural to mould the Sermon on the Mount into a body of Christian Law and to compare this Law with the Old Testament.

Martin Dibelius divides the authority of Jesus into two periods: Before Easter and After Easter. Thus before Easter Jesus was a prophet who by his life and pronouncements gave "signs" of the approaching Kingdom; After Easter the people knew Him not only as Teacher but as Redeemer whom God had raised in order to exalt and through faith in whom the Kingdom was made a reality. Thus the authority of Jesus had been confirmed and all believers endeavored to live by His way. Such a development inevitably led to the formation of Christian Law.

Thy Kingdom Come! Each time we utter that prayer we recognize that the commands of the Sermon on the Mount were meant for us, that the Kingdom is yet to come and that we endeavor to set our will in accordance with God's will. We must be careful that we do not make the mistake of the early Christians by interpreting the Sermon on the Mount

Christian Law. That is to forget its absolute and uncompromising demands. The Sermon on the Mount will not fit into relativistic moulds. The Kingdom in the Sermon on the Mount means that in every decision man faces the ultimate possibility of the Kingdom by his choice. His choice, therefore, is an absolute choice not relative: not mere loving, but either loving or hating in the light of the Kingdom.

It remains for us to endeavor to do the will of God while we recognize our inability to fulfill it completely. As Dibelius says, we must perform "signs of our new time," while we recognize that the Kingdom of God impinges upon every choice. In the present crisis we must not succumb to the temptation to weaken the paradoxical character of the Gospel. Reinhold Niebuhr says, "The Kingdom of God is relevant to every moment

in history as an ideal possibility and as a principle of judgment upon present realities." The Sermon on the Mount is a picture of what we ought to be. In this day of revolution and change, we will do well to recall those in whom Jesus actually saw the Kingdom existing, and then to ask ourselves as Churchmen if we have any hope of coming into our inheritance. The Sermon on the Mount is a storehouse of radical action. It insists that the Kingdom belongs to God's "little ones." The Church needs repentance in this matter. It has too easily erased the tension which should characterize its worldly form. It must reach out to the counterpart of those who *heard* the Sermon in Jesus' day. Who more truly understands its language than these "little ones"—these who hunger and thirst after righteousness—and these who just hunger and thirst!



SEPTEMBER FELLOWSHIP MEETING

The Fall meeting of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians will be held as usual at Camp Northover, Bound Brook, New Jersey, from the 16th to the 18th of September. Because no Spring Conference was held, the Fellowship is venturing upon the experiment of a full two-day Conference beginning with supper on the 16th and ending on the afternoon of the 18th.

Two primary problems will be considered:

First, *The Relationship of Power to Justice in the Christian Interpretation of Life and Society*.

This topic will be developed in terms of both the domestic and the foreign political problem.

Secondly, *The Problem of Race in the Christian Life*.

Under this topic we will discuss whether the Christian ethic has not underestimated the seriousness of this problem in recent decades, and whether it must not be re-examined on the basis of the same presuppositions that have prompted Christian realists to depart from the general liberal interpretation of the economic problem.

Assuming that automobiles will not be available as in previous years, arrangements will be made to transport guests from the railroad station to the Camp.

Will members of the Fellowship and readers of this journal living at a distance, inform us if they desire a detailed program of the Conference. Such a program will be sent in any event to all members of the Fellowship in the Eastern States.

HISTORY AND THE NEXT PEACE

By W. BURNET EASTON, JR.

The chief All-American pastime today among intellectuals, and among many who are not so intellectual, is working out formulas for "After the War." Everybody seems to be rushing into print or to microphone with new schemes for organizing the post-war world. We have already reached the stage where there are digests of different schemes. No one person who has anything else to do can even keep up with the digests, to say nothing of the plans themselves.

On the whole, this interest in the next peace is probably a good thing. In spite of the fact that most of the plans will not be relevant to the situation when peace finally comes, the discussion ought not be discouraged. The faith that we can somehow organize a better world next time is essential to an effective prosecution of the war now. Also there is the hope which is always partly realized in a democracy that the voice of the people will have some influence on the decisions of the leaders. If it were not for these factors it would be ridiculous for another person to enter this arena. In fact, I am not really entering the arena at all; this paper is not written with the intention of providing another blue-print of reconstruction. It is merely to try to present certain factors which should be included in our thinking, namely: that assuming an Allied Victory the attitudes of Russia and the United States will probably be the deciding factors at the peace table.

In the Spring issue of *Christianity and Society*, there was a symposium on "Marxism and Christianity" by Paul

Tillich and Eduard Heimann. It was a timely subject. Certainly if the United Nations win the war, Communism will be a major issue and Russia will come to the peace table with as many chips, if not more, than any other nation—and rightly so. However valuable their discussion, both Tillich and Heimann dealt primarily with theoretical Marxism rather than with the concrete expression of it today in Russia. One very real question is how far is Russia thoroughgoing in its Marxism? The kind of peace that will be made at the peace conference will be affected by what brand of Marxism, if any, Russia brings to the discussions.

Before returning to this question, there are certain considerations which should enter into all our thinking about the post-war world and the kind of a peace we will get. At least they should be accepted by Socialist Christians as basic to all our thinking.

I.

First, in all our political discussions we should keep reminding ourselves that this is God's world. On the larger plan, the next peace, whatever its political forms may be, will be the result of the dialectics between God and Men, in which God holds all the aces. In this regard, too, we should take encouragement in the words of Paul: "All things work together for good for them that love God." We shall get the kind of a peace we ought to get (just as we did the last time) and for this we should be thankful.

The question then becomes: how can we put ourselves in the position, or make ourselves ready, so that we get a peace that has some degree of permanence and stability which is more than the stability of exhausted warriors waiting to get back their strength. If this is God's world, as we believe it is, then the basic question is to discover what God is doing with his world in order that we may to some degree cooperate with it. Otherwise, all our programs, no matter how well intentioned, will be futile. It is frequently pointed out now-a-days that our present tragic situation is the judgment of God. With this opinion I am in entire agreement. But God is revealed to us not only as a God of wrath and of judgment but also as a God of infinite mercy, loving kindness, and forgiveness. If we can learn to try reasonably to fulfill His conditions we should expect a reasonably just and durable peace. One need not hold to utopian illusions of a perfect society to have the hope of a better and more lasting peace than the one we have just had. Dr. Tillich in his idea of the Kairos points out that in this sense we produce the Kingdom of God partially and temporarily whenever we fulfill the possibilities of a given situation. On this basis, it should be quite possible to fulfill enough of the possibilities of the post-war situation so that we "ought" to have a relatively decent world for a while anyway. The fact that some future generation undoubtedly will upset the applecart is not altogether our concern. Our concern is to fulfill the demands of God as far as we are able as the situations present themselves.

What then are, or will be, the demands of God after the war? In other words, what should we do to cooperate with what God is doing with our world? Cer-

tainly no man can answer this dogmatically. None of us knows what the conditions will be when this holocaust is over. While it may be profitable to make tentative blue-prints in order to keep up our morale, all blueprints are exceedingly tentative. In this sense, Churchill and Roosevelt are wise. Lesser people can work on concrete plans, but the leaders cannot, lest they find themselves in an even worse dilemma than Britain found itself in regard to Palestine after the last war. On the other hand, if God is the God of History he must reveal Himself in History, and from History we may learn something—perhaps enough to be ready to understand and fulfill the post-war conditions when they arrive. In this connection I have found Arnold J. Toynbee in his "Study of History" to have a valuable contribution to make.

II.

Toynbee's six volumes have been previously reviewed (*Christianity and Society*, Summer Number 1940) and can be only briefly recapitulated here. In summary, Toynbee analyzes the rises and falls of civilizations and finds that all previous civilizations, (although the time-span of their lives varies greatly) generally fit into the following pattern: In the initial stages of birth and growth a civilization led by "Creative Minority" finds creative responses to the various challenges which are presented to it either from the physical or human environment or both. As long as the leadership remains creative in the face of ever new challenges, the civilization continues to grow. Finally, however, and so far this has always been inevitably, there comes a time when the leadership loses its creativity or fails to meet some chal-

lenge. In sociological terms, this is because the leaders, glorying in their past creative achievements, fail to rise to new and different challenges; in theological terms it is due to human pride or sin. In this predicament the creative minority changes to a "Dominant Minority." During the period of growth when the leadership was creative it led the masses by the attraction of its creativity. Once this is lost, it must rule by power and force. This is the beginning of the downfall. The civilization splits into "vertical" and "horizontal" schisms. The vertical schisms appear in the form of "internecine warfare" between the various geographical groups or "parochial states" within the society. The horizontal schisms appear in the class divisions, the dominant minority and the internal proletariat within the geographical bounds of the society, and the external proletariat which collects on the fringes of the civilization. These last may and usually do form "warbands" which aggravate the vertical schisms and may hasten the final death of the civilization.

This in very brief summary is the pattern of the movement of history Toynbee works out. There are, however, one or two points, which need more amplification for the purposes of this paper. The "internecine warfare" which Toynbee also calls "The Time of Troubles" and which is the beginning of the breakdown comes to an end "through a 'knockout blow' in which a single surviving state is left staggering half dead among the corpses of its fellow combatants." The last victorious state may still have vitality enough to create, for a time, an "universal state" (that is, universal as far as that particular civilization is concerned), but its ultimate doom

has already been sealed. This has been the pattern of all the dead civilizations but there is no absolute mechanical law about it. Toynbee make it abundantly clear that "the dead civilizations are not 'dead by fate'; and, therefore, the living civilizations are not doomed inexorably in advance."

In his last volume, Toynbee goes on to analyze the position of our present Western Civilization and its relation to this pattern. Although he was writing before our present war broke out, his analysis is pregnant with meaning. Western Society is in its "Time of Troubles" or state of internecine warfare. This Time of Troubles began with the Wars of Religion in the Sixteenth Century and after a lull in the Seventeenth Century began again in the Eighteenth with the Wars of Nationalism which have grown increasingly violent. Unless we can find some creative response to the problem of international organization these wars will continue until at last one state delivers a knockout blow to win a Pyrrhic victory from which neither victor nor vanquished has ever been able to recover. And searchingly Toynbee asks: "Must we too purchase our *Pax Oecumenica* at this deadly price?"

If this is in any way an accurate analysis of the movement of history, it is also in some sense indicative of the way God is working with our world. Civilization seems to be driven to create larger areas of unity. If this is done peaceably and creatively the civilization has a normal healthy growth as with the Greek colonial expansion in the days before the Peloponnesian War. When, however, this expansion and unity is achieved by one nation primarily by the force of arms and domination as in the case of

Macedonians and Alexander, it is the beginning of the end of that civilization. The problem then is to produce unity, cooperation, and a relative degree of justice within the civilization without having these conditions bought at the price of one "parochial state" or one dominating all the others by its military might. There is really nothing new in this statement of the problem, for in the light of the foregoing analysis some things become clear.

If Germany wins this war, the pattern of breakdown so often repeated in the past will be fulfilled. In spite of the present effectiveness of the Japanese diversion, it is essentially a diversion. The diversion may get out of proportion and may even contribute directly to an Axis victory, but Germany is the key and Japan could not long survive after a German defeat (unless our appeasers get the upper hand, which would be tragic) or a German victory. If Germany wins, we shall have the completed picture: the "Time of Troubles" ending with one nation fulfilling the role of the Dominant Minority, a situation from which no civilization has yet recovered. Moreover, within the conquered countries we see this pattern already fulfilled in the roles of the Dominant Minority and the Internal Proletariat.

A United Nations victory would not inevitably produce the same situation. It is not that these nations are perfect, but that they can establish a *Pax Americana* without resorting to the use of at least some power. But their victory will be a group victory, not the victory of an individual state. While American production and manpower may, and we hope will, turn the tide, the victory will only be possible because Britain, Russia, China, and the "third front" in-

side Europe have made our help possible. This means that the final contest, as to who will establish the unity, will be still unsettled. Thus a United Nations' victory will present another opportunity to fulfill the Kairos, to use Tillich's term, or to find the "Creative response," to use Toynbee's. There will be an opportunity to achieve unity without the domination of one nation. But it is an opportunity fraught with danger. No man can predict the future, but it is hard to see how we shall get another opportunity if we miss again. The decision will be made at the peace conference, and the success of that conference will depend in a very large degree upon the attitude the United States and Britain take toward Russia.

III.

The major nations at that conference will obviously be Great Britain, Russia, China and the United States. Provided China gets reasonably decent treatment there is nothing to fear from it. In spite of the dictatorship of Chiang-Kai-shek, China is probably the most democratic country in the world, except possibly the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, it faces such tremendous internal problems with such vast resources that it will be a long time before it disturbs the peace of the world. This leaves the major decisions to be made by Great Britain, Russia, and this country.

Eduard Heimann in his article wrote: "It is incontrovertible that, in terms of economic organization, Nazism is a half-way station between Anglo-Saxon capitalism and Soviet Communism." This may be true but it also seems apparent that politically present day Soviet Russia is half-way between Nazism and Anglo-Saxon democracy. Within Communist

doctrine there are both tendencies toward totalitarian dictatorship and tendencies toward democracy. The very term "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" reveals both of these tendencies. Recent Russian history has revealed both of them. During the Litvinoff period, Russia tried to cooperate with the democracies. When this failed, Russia made an alliance with Hitler. This blunder has now forced Russia back into the democratic camp. This is not as difficult a shift for Russia as it would be for us, because both of these attitudes are inherent in Communism, and in each case, "scripture" can be found to justify Russia's action.

The attitude which Russia brings to the peace conference will very likely determine the success of that conference. If Russia chooses to cooperate (and it can find plenty of arguments for cooperation if it wants to) a reasonably just and durable peace may result. But if it does not choose to cooperate we are likely in for another and more violent stage of internecine warfare, for then the question of the unity of Western Civilization would still be undecided. The attitude which Russia brings to the peace conference will be the result of a realistic appraisal of the attitude of America and Britain toward it.

At the moment, it seems apparent that Great Britain is going a long way, and sincerely, to cooperate with Russia and to try to understand Russia. One suspects that if those two were alone, they

could come to a pretty fair understanding, particularly if events in England continue as they have. This lays the problem pretty much at our door. The question of what kind of a peace we shall have will largely depend on what our attitude toward Russia will be. If we are covertly antagonistic we can expect antagonism, and if we are genuinely sympathetic we can expect a similar response from Russia.

This does not mean that we all must join the Communist Party, nor that we approve of everything that goes on inside Russia. Neither does it mean that we must adopt the Russian internal organization for this country. But it does mean that as a nation we recognize that there are democratic elements in Communism that can be brought out, that we have something to learn from it and that Russia, as a nation, is our equal with just as deep, and perhaps a deeper, understanding of and concern for world peace and justice as we have.

No blue print for the post-war world made now is likely to be applicable when peace comes, but the Kairos or the challenger of peace will at least include the necessity for real cooperation between the United States and Russia. Our answer, our response, will determine the quality of a peace we deserve to get. If we fail, we shall again feel God's judgment, but if we respond creatively we shall feel His mercy and achieve some kind of a decent world order.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE MALVERN CONFERENCE

By RONALD PRESTON

The publication of the papers read at the Malvern Conference of January 1941* brings to a head a theological issue of great importance which has underlain Christian thought in England on several social and political questions for at least the last decade. That issue is the relation of the Christian doctrine of man, his nature and destiny, to the basic assumptions of the different social sciences which study man and his world and in particular to those of the science of economics. In turn, this same issue is bound up with the question of the validity and extent of the concept of "natural law." As the Editor of "Theology" pointed out in an important article in the Feb. 1942 number, that term has never dropped out of Roman Catholic moral theology, though it has in non-Roman thought. Its meaning is far from clear on examination, and what is surprising is to find it being widely used now in certain sections of the Church of England as if it had a clear and definite connotation which there is no need to define.

The question arises at the very beginning of the volume. In a short introduction, Dr. Temple says that Christian activity must be carried on at three distinct levels. There is firstly the task of proclaiming the Gospel in its purity and fullness; this is the limit of the Church's proper sphere of action. Next, there is the working out of "middle axioms," i.e.,

maxims which mediate between the fundamental principles and the tangle of particular problems; this was the work of the Malvern Conference. Lastly, there is the working out of actual political programmes, on which equally loyal Christians may have diametrically opposite opinions.

It is with regard to these middle axioms that queries arise. Are all Christians expected to agree on them? Can they be worked out on a theological basis alone? Or do they imply a study of the facts of a situation before they can be worked out? How absolute or relative are they? How detailed can they be? Unfortunately, none of the papers discuss these points, but for the most part assume one particular view. (Exactly how far Dr. Temple himself shares that view does not emerge, though to judge from his recent "Penguin Special" (Christianity and the Social Order) he makes considerable modifications in it.) The assumed view of most of the contributors is that the middle axioms are to be found in the concepts of natural law or natural order. Two corollaries appear to follow. The first is that all Christians, if they had a sound theology, would agree on the content of the natural law or the axioms. "Sound" in this context is hardly distinguishable from neo-Thomist. Secondly, the natural law or axioms are arrived at by rational deduction through the exercise of

The Life of the Church and the Order of Society, Longmans Green. \$3.50.

the natural reason without recourse to any of the particular specialisms which study the social and political systems.

These are the dominant assumptions of the book; broadly speaking it is the angle of approach of the Anglo-Catholic Summer School of Sociology or the "Christendom" group. But there are other strains. It is doubtful how far Mr. Donald Mackinnon and Mr. J. Middleton Murry share these views. It is quite clear that Sir Richard Acland and Mr. Kenneth Ingram do not; their pre-suppositions are more those of a liberal theology. One wonders how far the heterogeneous conference members, many of whom certainly did not share the "Christendom" approach to begin with, realized the assumptions behind what the various speakers said to them. However, that is another story.

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the Macedonians and Alexander, it is the beginning of the end of that civilization. The problem then is to produce unity, cooperation, and a relative degree of justice within the civilization without having these conditions bought at the price of one "parochial state" or a nation dominating all the others by its military might. There is really nothing new in this statement of the problem, but in the light of the foregoing analysis, some things become clear.

If Germany wins this war, the pattern of breakdown so often repeated in the past will be fulfilled. In spite of the present effectiveness of the Japanese diversion, it is essentially a diversion. The diversion may get out of proportion and may even contribute directly to an Axis victory, but Germany is the key. Britain and Japan could not long survive either a German defeat (unless our appeasers get the upper hand, which would be tragic) or a German victory. If Germany wins, we shall have the completed picture: the "Time of Troubles" ending with one nation fulfilling the role of the Dominant Minority, a situation from which no civilization has yet recovered. Moreover, within the conquered countries we see this pattern already fulfilled in the roles of the Dominant Minority and the Internal Proletariat.

A United Nations victory would not inevitably produce the same situation. It is not that these nations are perfect, nor that they can establish a *Pax Decumonica* without resorting to the use of at least some power. But their victory will be a group victory, not the victory of an individual state. While American production and manpower may, and we hope will, turn the tide, the victory will only be possible because Britain, Russia, China, and the "third front" in-

side Europe have made our help possible. This means that the final contest, as to who will establish the unity, will be still unsettled. Thus a United Nations' victory will present another opportunity to fulfill the Kairos, to use Tillich's term, or to find the "Creative response," to use Toynbee's. There will be an opportunity to achieve unity without the domination of one nation. But it is an opportunity fraught with danger. No man can predict the future, but it is hard to see how we shall get another opportunity if we miss again. The decision will be made at the peace conference, and the success of that conference will depend in a very large degree upon the attitude the United States and Britain take toward Russia.

III.

The major nations at that conference will obviously be Great Britain, Russia, China and the United States. Provided China gets reasonably decent treatment there is nothing to fear from it. In spite of the dictatorship of Chiang-Kai-shek, China is probably the most democratic country in the world, except possibly the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, it faces such tremendous internal problems with such vast resources that it will be a long time before it disturbs the peace of the world. This leaves the major decisions to be made by Great Britain, Russia, and this country.

Eduard Heimann in his article wrote: "It is incontrovertible that, in terms of economic organization, Nazism is a half-way station between Anglo-Saxon capitalism and Soviet Communism." This may be true but it also seems apparent that politically present day Soviet Russia is half-way between Nazism and Anglo-Saxon democracy. Within Communist

doctrine there are both tendencies toward totalitarian dictatorship and tendencies toward democracy. The very term "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" reveals both of these tendencies. Recent Russian history has revealed both of them. During the Litvinoff period, Russia tried to cooperate with the democracies. When this failed, Russia made an alliance with Hitler. This blunder has now forced Russia back into the democratic camp. This is not as difficult a shift for Russia as it would be for us, because both of these attitudes are inherent in Communism, and in each case, "scripture" can be found to justify Russia's action.

The attitude which Russia brings to the peace conference will very likely determine the success of that conference. If Russia chooses to cooperate (and it can find plenty of arguments for cooperation if it wants to) a reasonably just and durable peace may result. But if it does not choose to cooperate we are likely in for another and more violent stage of internecine warfare, for then the question of the unity of Western Civilization would still be undecided. The attitude which Russia brings to the peace conference will be the result of a realistic appraisal of the attitude of America and Britain toward it.

At the moment, it seems apparent that Great Britain is going a long way, and sincerely, to cooperate with Russia and to try to understand Russia. One suspects that if those two were alone, they

could come to a pretty fair understanding, particularly if events in England continue as they have. This lays the problem pretty much at our door. The question of what kind of a peace we shall have will largely depend on what our attitude toward Russia will be. If we are covertly antagonistic we can expect antagonism, and if we are genuinely sympathetic we can expect a similar response from Russia.

This does not mean that we all must join the Communist Party, nor that we approve of everything that goes on inside Russia. Neither does it mean that we must adopt the Russian internal organization for this country. But it does mean that as a nation we recognize that there are democratic elements in Communism that can be brought out, that we have something to learn from it and that Russia, as a nation, is our equal with just as deep, and perhaps a deeper, understanding of and concern for world peace and justice as we have.

No blue print for the post-war world made now is likely to be applicable when peace comes, but the Kairos or the challenge of peace will at least include the necessity for real cooperation between the United States and Russia. Our answer, our response, will determine the quality of a peace we deserve to get. If we fail, we shall again feel God's judgment, but if we respond creatively we shall feel His mercy and achieve some kind of a decent world order.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE MALVERN CONFERENCE

By RONALD PRESTON

The publication of the papers read at the Malvern Conference of January 1941* brings to a head a theological issue of great importance which has underlain Christian thought in England on several social and political questions for at least the last decade. That issue is the relation of the Christian doctrine of man, his nature and destiny, to the basic assumptions of the different social sciences which study man and his world and particular to those of the science of economics. In turn, this same issue is bound up with the question of the validity and extent of the concept of "natural law." As the Editor of "Theology" pointed out in an important article in the Feb. 1942 number, that term has never dropped out of Roman Catholic moral theology, though it has in non-Roman thought. Its meaning is far from clear on examination, and what is surprising is to find it being widely used now in certain sections of the Church of England as if it had a clear and definite connotation which there is no need to define.

The question arises at the very beginning of the volume. In a short introduction, Dr. Temple says that Christian activity must be carried on at three distinct levels. There is firstly the task of proclaiming the Gospel in its purity and fullness; this is the limit of the Church's proper sphere of action. Next, there is the working out of "middle axioms," i.e.,

maxims which mediate between the fundamental principles and the tangle of particular problems; this was the work of the Malvern Conference. Lastly, there is the working out of actual political programmes, on which equally loyal Christians may have diametrically opposite opinions.

It is with regard to these middle axioms that queries arise. Are all Christians expected to agree on them? Can they be worked out on a theological basis alone? Or do they imply a study of the facts of a situation before they can be worked out? How absolute or relative are they? How detailed can they be? Unfortunately, none of the papers discuss these points, but for the most part assume one particular view. (Exactly how far Dr. Temple himself shares that view does not emerge, though to judge from his recent "Penguin Special" (Christianity and the Social Order) he makes considerable modifications in it.) The assumed view of most of the contributors is that the middle axioms are to be found in the concepts of natural law or natural order. Two corollaries appear to follow. The first is that all Christians, if they had a sound theology, would agree on the content of the natural law or the axioms. "Sound" in this context is hardly distinguishable from neo-Thomist. Secondly, the natural law or axioms are arrived at by rational deduction through the exercise of

The Life of the Church and the Order of Society, Longmans Green. \$3.50.

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However, this is a subsidiary question to our main one. Whether we base our conception of natural law on the Christian revelation or not, the question still

remains, how far can we deduce the right relations between things or persons, or between different things in the social world without bringing in the different specialisms; how detailed we can legitimately become without their aid? I could maintain that the Christian view (1) the dignity of man as created in the image of God and (2) his sinfulness because he perpetually makes himself instead of God the centre of his world, does lead to certain *general* principles of criticism when considering the social and political world. Putting them negatively, we can deduce from the first point that poverty, insecurity and arbitrary inequality are undesirable, and from the second that social power must be responsible and subject to check, otherwise it will certainly be wielded for corrupt ends. The famous saying of Lord Acton comes at once to mind. "Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely; great men are almost always mad." But these are principles of criticism to be used in evaluating any social system and are never fully realized in practice by any. To understand how things work now, what can best be done to improve the situation, given the existing tendencies and resources, in the light of these overarching criteria, we need technical knowledge. This assumes that the social sciences are to a certain definite extent neutral and that their autonomy must be respected. At the same time, knowing the weakness of all specialists for interpreting the universe in terms of their own specialism, we must watch lest a disguised anthropology creeps in. Economics has certain technical norms, such as efficiency, regularity and adaptability, which to a greater or lesser extent can always be subordinated to non-economic considerations, but which it is folly to

ignore altogether, as it is not to pay heed to the help that that science can give in avoiding the choosing of contradictory policies. Of course, any policy implies a philosophy behind it and here for the Christian his doctrine comes in. Much work needs to be done on the exact extent to which a fundamental doctrine of man is implied in the social sciences but this is surely the right place from which to start, not from the over-detailed deductions of natural law, which is where most of these papers begin. None of them shows any signs of having faced up to the serious criticism of their whole procedure in Emil Brunner's great book on Christian ethics, "Das Gebot und die Ordnungen" (English translation, "The Divine Imperative") especially in chapter 25 on "Autonomy, Natural Law and Love" and in a special appendix on Natural Law, pages 627-633, where he comes to the conclusion that "What God requires for the ordering of the conditions of society cannot be rationally deduced from a rational system, but it can only be discovered on each particular occasion, in obedience to the revealed will of God, by means of the reason." This is another way of stating the position for which we have just contended.

The consequences of not starting here are plainly visible in this volume in two respects; in the philosophy of history that results, and in the analysis of the modern world which is given. Canon V. A. Demant is the best example of the former. His paper to a large extent repeats the argument of his book, "The Religious Prospect." This is his thesis: "If we look at the revolutions of post-renaissance Europe in a dialectical way, we get a forceful impression of a series of struggles to embody a wholeness of life, each answering the last, but missing

the wholeness by giving absolute divine value to the previously neglected elements of it. This impression appears to me to indicate a definite structure of the human spirit and a definite structure of society to respond to it, a frame in which, however, there can be many variations. Mankind is always seeking it. Europe has come nearest to finding it piecemeal, only to break up its approximations again. I think, therefore, we must be bold enough to envisage the post war task as the fulfilment of the destiny of Europe. . . . So long as men are moved by fear of what they reject and not by faith in what they make for, they experience the wrath of God. . . . We in England stand in a situation in which, so far as I am able to see, there can be no further European revolution which is a negative reaction to the last."

That is his fundamental position. Notice that it assumes the uneasy alliance of biblical Hebraic thought with Aristotelianism which was characteristic of the middle ages, to be a kind of norm. Here, of course, is where natural law, which took such a large place in scholastic thought, comes in. This is what underlies the phrase "a definite structure of society." The remark, "mankind is always seeking it" might be considered an indication that Demant thinks of it as a norm which will always stand over against the partial achievements of a particular era (a position for which we have contended), but the last sentence implies something realizable after the war. Christianity no longer becomes, to paraphrase A. N. Whitehead, a religion forever in search of a social system in which to embody itself. There is to be an end in Dr. Demant's view to the dialectical process, just as there is in Marxism. This is the whole weakness of his

position; a too detailed and specific deduction of the content of natural law and of the desirable social system to be based on it, so that the whole concept becomes insufficiently transcendental.

This brings us to the second point, the unsatisfactory analysis of the modern world which results from such premises. It is not surprising to find that a common ignorance of economics unites most of the contributors, since on their theory such knowledge is not necessary. (In the latter part of Dr. Demant's paper, for instance, there is a number of economic generalizations of a hit and miss type, some sound, some not.) Nor is it surprising to find that a Professor of Philosophy gave a paper involving a discussion of the re-casting of the monetary system, unemployment and a possible post-war slump. Professor Hodges, however, has significantly had second thoughts and has refused to have his paper printed in the volume. Again, it is quite in keeping to find Mr. W. G. Peck once more talking nonsense about the economic system as he has done for years past, and building up a great case on a crudely fallacious under-consumption theory. He also shows an inability to understand the different possible kinds of collectivism, consigning them all to the devil. I rather suspect that the "autonomous economic" which he castigates fiercely, really boils down to a system which allows consumers to buy what they think they want and not what someone else thinks they should have. If so, one gathers from the general tenour of his paper that he ought to approve of it. If not, what *does* it mean? The Archbishop challenges those who disagree with the assumptions of most of the speakers to do so on *theological* grounds and we gladly take up the challenge.

Mr. Peck's economic errors have a theological origin in a theology which forbids him to take economics seriously, because he has an unsatisfactory view of natural law, which in turn goes back to the inadequacies of the Thomist synthesis which he takes as a norm. (With other of his theological statements such as "the spirit of man is born for freedom in a community of free spirits" we cordially agree.) Mr. Maurice Reckitt is also dominated by much the same assumptions and, in a paper which is more clever than profound, certainly fails to sustain his central thesis that war is a logical upshot of the present economic and social order. It is noteworthy that there is no analysis or grasp among these writers of the working of the war-time economic system, an extreme form of regulated capitalism. Yet the way in which the problems it presents are dealt with, will to a major extent condition what is possible in the post-war world, whose foundations they are so busy laying in the abstract.

We turn now to a brief notice of the remaining papers, which raise other points than the major one on which we have concentrated. Miss Dorothy Sayre contributes an extremely able and well constructed paper to argue that the church must sanctify the *whole* of human life without, however, identifying itself with any relative and transitory social, political or artistic system. In the course of it she makes an illuminating comparison between the kind of community the church should be compared with the intense but narrow fellowship of the actors' world on the one hand and the totalitarian exclusiveness of the Nazi "church" on the other. She ends with a strong plea for intellectual integrity in

the Church in all spheres, and especially with regard to the arts.

About Mr. Mackinnon's paper it is hard to write. It is certainly a difficult one, and despite his apologia there seems no inherent reason why the subject of "Revelation and Social Justice" should be so obscure. Moreover, the proofs have been very carelessly read. I am far from sure that I understand him, but it seems that he makes an attempt to ride the neo-Thomist and Barthian horses at the same time which is more ingenious than successful. The first part is taken up with an enquiry as to "whether Christian dogmas are in any sense to be regarded as factual propositions and intelligible in some sense analogous to that in which the factual propositions concerning the external world are intelligible." In so far as I understand the subsequent attack on Kant, he seems to be denying the relativity of all theological propositions on the assumption that the concept of being is not itself analogical and relative, which I should dispute. There follows a denial of the possibility of a synthesis of knowledge because man is a fallen creature (here the Barthian strain comes out); but surely that is no reason for not trying; the law of love is equally an impossibility but that is no reason for making no effort at all. Rather, as Niebuhr would say, both are impossible impossibilities. In the midst of these rather dry bones, there are some powerful passages in which the author describes man as either responding to the invitation of communion with God, or else as lost in an abyss and in which the scandal of the Church is driven relentlessly home. It is actually in the family of God that Satan achieves his most complete victories. "Father, if it

be possible, let this church pass from me." Yet this same church is the place wherein the scandal of the Cross is forever actual and it is the Cross which "reveals the final secret of the relation of man and God. Apart from the darkness of Golgotha we know neither what we do nor what we are."

Mr. Middleton Murry's paper is a moving denunciation of modern society and its large scale techniques as an unholy thing, violating the integrity of human personality. It is not so much a rational argument as a statement of feeling, not unlike that of the late Eric Gill, ending with the words "the Church failed in leadership because it shows no signs of having known despair, no evidence of having been *terrified* by its own impotence."

We have already seen that Sir Richard Acland and Mr. Kenneth Ingram proceed on different assumptions from most of the contributors. The former's short but lively paper is devoted to the abolition of private property in the means of production, as a moral issue, a cure for selfishness. He hardly seems to appreciate the extent to which selfishness can corrupt any social system unless strong safeguards both positive and negative, are thought out against it. He does, however, make a very good point against the many Christians (including the Archbishop himself) who are so anxious to give labor a share in management, that they overlook the safeguards necessary. Speaking to Dr. Temple he said, "I gravely fear that your suggestion might give the employees a vested interest in all those things which the employers in their industry were inclined to do against the interests of the community and of the workers in other industries." Mr. Ingram pursues the same theme, argu-

ing cogently for a type of planning which will safeguard freedom. "The special responsibility of Christians is to ensure that individual liberty is furthered and not impaired by a socialist civilization." There are some hasty economic generalizations later on in the paper, including the dragging out of the thoroughly question-begging phrase "production for use and not for profit." No one can earn any income, wages or profits, unless the public thinks the product sufficiently useful to buy. What he is really objecting to is the unequal distribution of money income which gives those who are wealthiest the largest say in determining the course of production. Let us attack the real source of the trouble and not use words which obscure it nor tinker about with consumer choice. Mr. Ingram's economic error arises, not through a theory of natural law, as in the case of Mr. Peck, but through taking semi-Marxist clichés without examination, to the neglect of economic knowledge.

It remains to end where we began with Dr. Temple. He stands for no mere return to scholasticism, for in discussing it he says (1) that Maritain has injected into the thought of Aquinas a large dose of what is most characteristic of the Renaissance and the Reformation—an appreciation of individual personality (2) that neither Thomism nor the neo-Thomism of Maritain is as adequate as the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr for dealing with the nature of sin and its necessary consequence in society—power politics. "Man puts himself in the centre where God ought to be, thus claiming in effect to be the God of his own world." Or, as Mr. Mackinnon says, man as a sinner is "the spiritual Titan, who makes himself equal to God and

eks to make God his servant. Dr. Temple's closing review smooths over the intellectual confusion of the final session of the conference, the differing viewpoints among the papers, the doubts as to how far the conference members realized the implications of what they were hearing and discussing, and the lack of relation between the report of the conference (I.C.F. 2d) and its proceedings. Stranger still, all the very thorough work put into the Oxford Ecumenical Conference of 1937, far more carefully prepared than Malvern and presented to a gathering far better prepared, is never once referred to, and Dr. Temple goes back to C.O.P.E.C. at Birmingham in 1924 for purposes of comparison. Yet Malvern cannot compare with Oxford in authority. Perhaps this ignoring of Oxford is due to the theology which dominated the leaders at Malvern, less sound in my opinion than that underlying the report of Section 3 of the Oxford Conference, which is an excellent document.

There is a danger that many Anglicans with a social concern will be led to accept ideas whose theological implications they may not realize and would not like if they did realize. One cannot help feeling that Malvern was intellectually unsatisfactory and left much to be desired as a conference. Its findings have achieved an importance they do not deserve. But the papers can be considered on their own merits, as we have tried to do. If they had had to stand the criticisms of other view-points as the Oxford ones had, they would have been more valuable. That is the danger of an ingrown conference.

More work must be done on the question of natural law and I believe it will show that its theoretical unsoundness caused it to break down in the past, and that Catholic ethics will never be able to cope with the modern world by trying to revive it in any but a greatly modified form which allows for the insights of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

BOOK REVIEWS

LEWIS COREY, THE UNFINISHED TASK: ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOR DEMOCRACY. New York, 1942. pp. XIII and 314. \$3.00.

This book is not inspired by our philosophy. The author, who has traveled far, and without any benefit of academic training, from his strictly proletarian beginnings through the days of his fame as the foremost Marxian writer in this country to the present brilliant and utterly unorthodox achievement, is open-minded enough to recognize the importance of moral issues in any institutional set-up. But he is still caught in the fetters of a belief in progress as a universal law. This difference of opinion, however, does not matter in an evaluation of this book. The reason is that the author's pragmatism has not hardened into a dogma; it is precisely what it claims to be: an unprejudiced quest for the potential forces of fundamental reform in our society and for their productive combination. In a sense, this is in the best tradition of the Marxian method, before it became a dogma, and the author is free from the hysteria so frequently in renegades. His undogmatic pragmatism is also compatible with our belief, simply because our dogma is outside the institutional field and requires implementation by the kind of pragmatic honesty and vision which are found in this author.

Beside Marx, Veblen can be mentioned as a teacher of the author's, who is so emphatic about the strategic position of the middle classes. But he has thrown out the totalitarian elements of Veblen

as those of Marx. His main teachers are the experience of totalitarianism, Russian and German, and that of American democracy. Checks and balances are to him the essence of liberty.

The old system of checks and balances has degenerated into an almost unchecked system of monopoly power, which destroys both property and liberty. It is significant that Corey uses the word monopoly in the same sense as Adam Smith and American Populism used to do; recent economic theory has convinced even pedants that this use is justified. In our age an almost unchecked governmental power arises against the power of monopoly, to redress the balance. But this is no solution; it only strengthens the great danger of all, that the two bureaucracies, monopoly and government, merge into one and thus produce precisely the totalitarian state. The old system of checks and balances is gone; what the author sets out to do is to draw up a new balanced system.

To put it differently, the cornerstone of democracy is functional property. To eliminate independent farmers and businessmen, as in both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, is the very criterion of reaction and totalitarianism. Functional property keeps arbitrary power out and rests liberty on service. Property without a function is no protection for the weak, e.g., the small stockholders; nor is it a protection against the strong, the financial overlords, whose power is in management, not in ownership. Nothing is wrong with private property where it is functional. It must be restored and strengthened where this is possible.

Where it is not possible, the method of checks and balances must be applied to different conditions in a different way.

The structure of the American economy, with 1200 out of 470,000 corporations in a ruling position, dominating many millions of employees directly and many millions of farmers, businessmen, and their employees indirectly through the market, suggests to the author a reorganization of those 1200. They are to be transformed into public corporations. This would restore freedom and property for the others, by eliminating restrictive financial practices from the management of the big corporations. This socialization is not all, however. The author goes into a detailed analysis of the functional groups and their aspirations and concludes that the transformation of the big corporations must unfetter the productive faculties and aspirations in both management and labor, but must also pit an independent organization of labor against management in order that they check their mutual power. No representation of the government is needed, since government influences the enterprise by way of its own agencies. In point of fact, the TVA does not add to the power of the Federal bureaucracy; it is a self-governing enterprise.

It is true, on the other hand, that in the sphere of heavy industries Corey's rule of maximum utilization of giant plants is not sufficient to secure proportionality and interlocking between them as is required for a smooth operation of the entire system. This is the field where some central planning will have to be done, much less than without that transformation, but more than the author seems to admit. Anyway it is interesting to see that the emphasis shifts

again from planning to socialization.

Free farmers, free businessmen, producers' and consumers' co-operatives can act securely once the strategic enterprises are operated with a view to maximum utilization rather than to bonuses in proportion to financial returns. Because the author realizes that liberty is in decentralization and diversity, in checks and balances, he is emphatic about the independence of labor unions and their right to strike, even against the "government-owned" public corporations—they are not the government. For the same reason he is critical of closed shop; and his wisdom and devotion to the cause of liberty culminates in one stipulation of his "economic constitution" and Bill of Rights, to the effect that members of any group have the constitutional right to appeal to an independent economic judiciary for individual protection against what they consider unjust decisions of the group, e.g., by labor czars.

In sum, this book gives us a new idea of economic democracy, much more specific, realistic, and democratic than the one we used to have. There is good reason to be grateful for the book.

Eduard Heimann.

MILLHANDS AND PREACHERS:
A STUDY OF GASTONIA, by
Liston Pope. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1942. 369 pp., XVI.
Index. \$4.00.

Liston Pope's book is an intensive study of the relation of religious groups—Churches and sects—to the economic culture of Gaston County, North Carolina. It is the type of investigation that has been greatly needed; and the enterprise is carried out with thoroughness and insight. Gaston County, of which Gastonia is the county seat, offers a

splendid laboratory for such research, in as much as it has grown in the last seventy-five years from an almost purely rural, agricultural community to one of the largest centers of the textile industry in the nation. Dr. Pope has traced this development and has shown the relation of the Churches (and sects) to it.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the ante-belleum Churches in the South was their almost complete justification and sanctification of the agrarian (and slave-holding) way of life. After the war between the state, when the "new South" began to rise, the Churches were in the vanguard of the boosters who saw the hope for rebirth in industrial development. As Dr. Pope clearly shows, the Churches were not only influential but, also, through individual ministers, instrumental in bringing about industrialization—mostly in the form of textile mills. When still a mere adolescent, this economic culture began to sweep all before it. The churches no longer directed it but became its handmaidens. This is especially true of the mill village churches.

Time and again Dr. Pope points out—and supports with voluminous details and documentation—that, despite the fact that the mills have given financial support to the mill churches, there has been practically no overt pressure brought upon the churches by the mills. Indeed it has not been necessary: the churches themselves are so engulfed in the culture that the ministers automatically think in terms of it. In regard to the famous strike in the Laray Mills in Gastonia in 1929, where almost all of the ministers were opposed to the strike, Dr. Pope points out that they were not acting simply as hired stool-pigeons for the employers. "All the ministers, of

course, recognized the power of the employers in the community and the hazard to their own status that might be involved in appraising them. Most of the ministers, nevertheless, appear to have been sincerely opposed to the strike apart from questions of personal advantage. They were constrained by general culture much more powerfully than they could have been by fear or financial self-interest. They endorsed, as they still do, the tradition that the mills represent a blessing without qualification, and therefore should be carefully protected, and that mill workers should look up to their employers in gratitude and patience. In another context, Dr. Pope points out that none of the ministers "suspected that they might be instruments used for ulterior motives—nor did the superintendent of the mill recognize any such implication. The cultural context in which executives and ministers alike live and work bluntly decrees that making good tire fabrics and good Christians are correlative processes, and the directors of each process have learned that co-operation is profitable for them all.

The detailed analysis of this phenomenon is perhaps the most important aspect of *Millhands and Preachers*; but there are many other interesting and important aspects and items. Dr. Pope deals incisively with the problem first raised by Froelish of the relation and difference between the church and the sect. He shows that in the mill village the most extreme sects—such as Holiness or Pentacostal, generally labelled "Holy Rollers"—have grown up to meet needs which the older churches (some of which were formerly sects) fail to meet. His specific conclusions are backed up by what appears to this reviewer to be very sound theory.

Those who know the history of American dissent will be interested to see that the same phenomena which marked dissenting groups in colonial times continue to be repeated: a strictly moralistic in-group ethic and opposition to the world in general, resulting in a complete lack of any social ethic; emotional, often chiliastic, piety which, together with other worldliness, serves as a release from the despair of their present lot or a smug assurance of a place in heaven higher than those who now enjoy the fruits of this earth. There is no doubt that such religious expressions are economically conditioned; but, as Dr. Pope shows, a purely economic interpretation is, to say the least, distorting. Interestingly enough, one of the few preachers who identified himself with the strikers at Laray in 1929, was H. J. Crabtree, minister of the Church of God—one of the new extreme sects. Brother Crabtree preached to a group of strikers, taking as his text, "Deliver me, O Lord, from the evil man; preserve me from the violent man." Then he proceeded to preach: "I call God to witness who has been the violent man in this strike," implying—and rightly for the most part—that the employees had started the violence. "But we must bear it," he continued. "Paul and Silas had to go through with it and today they sit a-singing around the great white throne. In a few days you will be a-singing through the streets of Laray with good wages. God's poor man's God. Jesus Christ, Himself, was born in an old ox-barn in Bethlehem. He was kicked about, appeared about and finally nailed on a cross. And for what? For sin. It's sin that's causing this trouble. Sin of the rich man, the man who thinks he's rich." Brother Crabtree was not con-

fused when he spoke of the rich man and the man who thinks he is rich. Wealth, he knew, is in the final analysis illusory; the pride of the wealthy is based on self-deception, and such pride rides before a fall. He seems to have had as part of his theology a sort of theoretic communism. "All the wealthy men in this here crowd hold up their hands," he commanded. And then he took what must have been a surprisingly new departure. "I'll hold mine up for one," he cried. "My father owns this whole world. He owns every hill in this world and every tater in them hills."

Such a point of view was and is rare even for the more educated ministers in Gaston County. Few indeed have any economic or sociological insight nor any genuine transcendence of the economic system. Dr. Pope discusses at length the general avoidance by the parsons of all economic and political problems. The prevailing social philosophy is that everything would be all right if everyone would follow the Golden Rule; and the parson's job is to change individuals. In a footnote Dr. Pope declares, "They have, however, engaged in direct institutional action, through sermons, committees, resolutions, and financial contributions, in favor of a program of syphilis control, attainment of recreational facilities, support of charitable agencies, elimination of gambling, prostitution, pool rooms and liquor, and any number of other enterprises. They have not left such matters to 'changed individuals'." Of course, the preachers would reply that these are "moral" issues, whereas political and economic questions are not—which in a sense is true. But the way in which the Southern clergy have used prohibition as the outlet for whatever social conscience they have calls

for a direct attack on their ethical ideas and their idea of ethics. Because of this it seems too bad that Dr. Pope relegated the above quoted paragraph to a footnote. It deserves expansion and a greater emphasis; but perhaps that would be more polemical than the book is intended to be.

Be that as it may, this reviewer, as a Southerner, raises up a fervent prayer that the book will receive the wide reading which it so richly deserves, so that Northerners may better understand the South and its problems and especially so that Southerners, above all Southern parsons, will better understand themselves and their land.

Richard Day.

WORLD ORDER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, by *Hans Kohn*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1942, 337 pp.

This is the fourth and final volume in a series of books written by Mr. Kohn on the ideas dominating the world crisis. (*Force or Reason* (1938), *Revolutions and Dictatorships* (1939), *Not by Arms Alone* (1940).) Mr. Kohn believes that everything most fundamental to human life is at stake in this war: "Never has mankind faced a world crisis comparable to the present one. Its unprecedented challenge can be met only by an unprecedented response, the establishment of a world order based upon liberty and equality." Mr. Kohn writes in an energetic style to convince the American public of his faith.

Mr. Kohn's philosophy of history is conducive to a prophetic type of writing. Convinced that ideas are the determinant forces in life, he views history through the concepts dominating and expressing periods; he analyzes conflicts

by exposing contradictions between concepts. "We have almost forgotten that all great struggles of history were fundamentally struggles between moral and spiritual forces, struggles of ideas." So the present crisis is a revolution of anarchy and egotism against the established order of moral and intellectual values. It is not a conflict for a new balance of power, or between rival imperialisms or for the revision of a peace treaty, but a struggle between contrasting philosophies of man and his place in history. Logically then, the crisis can be overcome only by a reaffirmation and a rededication to the moral values of democratic civilization. To this task Mr. Kohn calls his readers. Moreover, argues Mr. Kohn, this task has been prepared by the inner logic of history. In this final volume he discusses four dominant concepts which he believes point in their own development to the possibility and necessity of a world order: democracy, nationalism, empire, and civilization. Democracy has reached a stage where no one can be safe in their freedoms unless all men are free. Nationalism, connected with political organizations, has come to the end of its constructive period and must give way to a depoliticized nationality. Empire can now survive only in the form of a world order based on a community of law. Finally, the crisis is the occasion for the recovery of civilization.

This book is good for public morale. It contains many moving passages on the fundamentals of democratic faith. Against those who claim that military victory must be won before we talk about world order, Mr. Kohn insists on the vision of a new order as a crucial factor in achieving victory. Against those who believe that an order can be planned

without reference to winning the war, Mr. Kohn insists on the prior responsibility of defeating the axis. In contrast to those who are pessimistic about the possibilities of achieving a decent peace, Mr. Kohn is optimistic. Indeed the tone of the book, with its assurance of better things to come, reminds one of some old-fashioned nineteenth century liberal!

The idealist character of Mr. Kohn's interpretation presents at least two perils. In the first place, the underlying philosophy of history precludes consideration of certain fundamental factors involved in the crisis. Ideas *are* creative factors, but so are the interests out of which they emerge. Mr. Kohn goes too far in his reaction against the over-simplifications of Marxian interpretation. Germany and Japan are allies not primarily because of the similarity of their ideologies, but because, for the moment at least, their imperial ambitions are harmonious. Imperialism itself is motivated as much by economic concerns as by the desire to spread a culture. Mr. Kohn provides an excellent interpretation of the manner in which values regulate, guide, and restrain the dynamic forces of society, but he does not adequately take account of the way in which conditions themselves restrict and retard the realization of values. It may be time for political idealisms to depart, yet they remain a stubborn reality with which we will have to work in constructing the post-war world. It may be time for democratic imperialists to reform their ways, but they are still recalcitrant. With almost no references whatsoever to fundamental economic issues, Mr. Kohn's transition from victory to world order has an air of unreality about it.

Secondly, the image of the world order itself is only vaguely suggested:

an order based on the recognition of the dignity of man, his liberty and equality. We do not mean to imply that Mr. Kohn should have provided the proverbial blue-print, but we do believe that utopian, heart-warming visions themselves are not enough, and that they may prove dangerous. Assuredly the skepticism which Mr. Kohn desires to counteract is disastrous, but there is no less a peril in circulating the illusion that it is possible as a result of this war to get a full-blown democratically run world order of all peoples. If we are to be safe against post-war disillusion we must talk in down-to-the-earth fashion about the kind of world the United Nations are likely to be able to build after victory.

In the last analysis, however, we cannot avoid the challenge of this book: to embody in the new order the democratic principles and broadly humane spirit which characterize all of Mr. Kohn's writing.

Dorothy Fosdick.

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by *Lewis Lorwin*, Random House, 502 pp. \$3.00.

This volume provides a unique and extremely valuable contribution to the discussion of the post-war world. Dr. Lorwin puts clearly the issue at stake in the war: "... tragic as the Second World War may be, it now has a meaning far beyond the causes of its origins. It is no longer merely a struggle of groups of Powers for political mastery or military supremacy. It has become a fight not for settling past accounts but to make sure who shall own and build the future, and how. It is now a bitter and bloody contest for leadership in organizing the productive and cultural energies of man-

kind either for a new forward development in behalf of humanity or for increasing exploitation in the interests of small racial or social groups." The war is a conflict for world order, and we, certainly never made the issue; as a nation we have consistently sought to avoid it. It is curious that in spite of this paramount issue of the war, concern for the post-war world order is limited largely to those who have always been active in international relations study groups—and to pacifists. The former tend to focus attention on the rearrangement of international machinery and to underemphasize the importance of economic factors, while the latter tend to an "apocalyptic" approach to post-war planning, avoiding the absolutely decisive necessity for victory for the allies if there is to be any possibility of democratic post-war planning. This book is an antidote to the weaknesses of both these schools.

Dr. Lorwin, in a readable yet well-documented section, analyses the basic doctrines of Nazism, the economic organization and policy of Germany, and the consequences of a Nazi victory. This last part is based not on nightmare speculations, but on the actual policy of economic organization which Germany has carried out in the occupied countries—given country by country from official German sources. It is a most concise, concrete and up-to-the minute analysis of the "New Order in Europe." The author also includes, but in less detail, a similar consideration of "The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

The other half of the book deals with the basic principles of democracy, its socio-economic basis, its role in international relations since the beginning, and an analysis of the consequences of democratic victory, including the various pro-

posals from "Union Now" to a "World New Deal."

Those who feel that the Nazis may after all, be doing a service by "uniting" Europe in a sort of "United States of Europe," will have their illusions dispelled by the record spread in these pages. *German* political and economic necessities alone are the sine qua non of Nazi economic organization of the conquered and "capitulated" countries. "The 'New European Order' will have, as the Nazis clearly say, only one master, one 'leader' and one 'centralizer' and that will be Germany." Similarly the "co-prosperity sphere" of "Greater Asia" is not to be merely a coordinated Empire, but also an economically integrated region whose resources are to be exploited under the direction and for the benefit of the Japanese.

Perhaps the most valuable portion of the book for many Americans studying the post-war world is the critique of various proposals emanating largely from Anglo-Saxon groups. The realism of Dr. Lorwin's analysis here is illustrated by a comment he makes on Federal Union: "The theoretical basis of Federal Union lies in the analysis of the concept of national sovereignty as the main, if not the only cause, of international anarchy." This combined with "a deep faith in the economics of individual enterprise and free trade," makes this proposal like so many Anglo-Saxon ones, too over-simplified. He discusses the question of an "international police force" as it should be discussed, not as an ideal in a vacuum, but in terms of the concrete history of the disarmament ventures of the League of Nations.

The members of a group like the Fellowship of Socialist Christians will find great interest in the chapter on World

Democratic Planning, to which Dr. Lorwin has made an outstanding contribution through his work in the I.L.O. and the National Resources Planning Board, as well as at the Brookings Institution. He defines "world economic planning" as "the application of forethought and collective guidance in organizing economic forces for definite social ends, and in using all resources for clearly planned improvements in the standards of living of all the people . . . Democratic planning represents a *technical-rationalistic* principle of action proceeding from given institutional conditions to whatever economic and social changes may be needed for raising levels of living. It is based on faith in rational human behavior, in the possibility of obtaining advances by agreement and in a willingness to make changes when and as they are forced by the basic purpose of utilizing in the most effective way for the social welfare of the people." An important and healthy emphasis is made on the necessity for the inclusion of nations with differing economic systems in any scheme for world economic planning. This is a vivid example of the strength and weakness of the "social planners," "technocrats" and "managerial revolutionists." The strength lies in the clear definition of the right purpose of economic activity: to use the resources of the earth to meet human need and the directing of economic organization consciously to that end. The weakness lies in its liberal rationalism, its faith in "rational human behavior" which ignores both the nature of man and the nature of social forces. The implications of this can be seen in the absurdly slight and inconsequential dealing with the "labor and socialist proposals" for new-world order. Whether it is in his dealing with the role

of the Communist Party or the A.F.L. and C.I.O., Dr. Lorwin reveals a complete under-estimation of the significance of social forces in the form of People's movements. The data from which deductions are made is totally inadequate, in spite of his very able marshalling of data on other aspects of his subject. One suspects it is because he does not consider the labor and socialist movements important in the solution.

In spite of this, the proposals in this section bare careful study by those interested in post-war plans. They offer a more fruitful field for discussion than arguments about "regionalism vs. world organization," an "international police force vs. total disarmament," etc. The whole book is sure to lift discussions of post-war world organization out of the pit which perennially besets such discussion. Dr. Lorwin describes this abyss when he says of the Pan-Europe idea (of the 1930's): "Its adherents represented such a range of political, economic and social ideas that one cannot escape the feeling that it was one of those things about which all 'nice' people agreed, but for such different reasons and with such mental reservations that the moment it came to taking practical steps in any direction it would turn out that no one really agreed."

Rose Terlin.

DAWN OF VICTORY, by Louis Fischer. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc. New York. 1942. \$2.75.

It is not easy to describe this book. It deals very little with the military situation. The title comes from the conviction, which informs the book, that basic uncertainty about the war's outcome belongs to the past. While victory is not yet won it begins to seem a practical pos-

sibility. Fischer does not offer any startling new way to win the war. We cannot criticize him for that but we might fairly ask of him more of his reasons for considering victory within the grasp of the United Nations. I agree with him about the possibility of victory but it is incumbent upon one who writes books and makes speeches to give a reason for the hope that is in him.

We might describe this volume as "one of those books about the war." It gives the issues and sketches many of the persons who have to do with it. It is by no means complete, for it says nothing about the war in the Far East and as little about the Axis. In effect it is an interpretation of the war on the side of Britain, the United States and Russia. It deals with the immediate past of these nations and the present. It speaks in general terms of a strategy for victory and addresses itself soberly to the problems of peace.

Five of the ten chapters are devoted to Britain. He says, truly, that the war came out of the rebellion of the British people against appeasement and that in this sense it has been a people's war from the start. Hitler is no longer the sign of their shame but the signal of their glory. One curious note is the remark of John Strachey that he would like to bring his family back to England lest they miss its most exalted experience. Curious also is the remark that while no one should stay out of England during the war, no one should remain in it afterward.

Fischer thinks that the war has shaken England to the depths. Being a war of production and of the bombing of civilians it has depended in a new way upon the common people. They fight it and it would certainly be unfair to take its

fruits away from them. He asserts that the exigencies of the war have caused the people to have a more important voice than formerly. Also the people themselves are aware of the problem of carrying over their newly-won importance into the peace. On the other hand, the people of privilege recognize with equal clearness the ultimate threat against their position. They have been trying to consolidate their positions and their influence accounts for the remnants of defensive-mindedness and general timorousness in the conduct of the war. Fischer is not naive about the existence of the struggle but he is not without hope about its outcome.

While he is more optimistic about Britain than some liberals he is less unrestrained in his enthusiasm for Russia than others. Because of Russia's magnificent and effective stand against the Nazi hordes many people find it hard to retain any critical elements in their outlook. Not so, Fischer. For many years he was one of those liberals who invested most of their earthly hopes in the Russian experiment, allowing their critical faculties to abdicate. Gradually, however, his eyes were opened to the all too earthly aspects of the dictatorship. His enlightenment matured slowly and quietly but it burst upon the world particularly in the pamphlet "Stalin and Hitler," published in 1940. Now he does not propose to go back on his awakening. In fact, one feels that there is something of the burnt child fearing the fire in his attitude. Can it be that he has transferred his hopes to Britain without changing their nature and that this accounts for his enthusiasm for the English?

Fischer realizes that Soviet morale is one of the notable things of the war, a morale that was expected as little as that

of the English. He says that it is due to the virtues in the Soviet regime and despite its vices. The facts are not quite so simple as that. Undoubtedly there is something in the modern Russia to arouse loyalty and fire hope. This is the good in it. But nationalism is an ingredient in the morale; and nationalism is not good socialism but one of Stalin's aberrations. The adequate armament of Russia also supports morale. But huge armaments are related as directly to the psychology of dictatorship as lack of them is connected with the weaknesses of democracy. While Fischer is reserved in his attitude toward Russia he is clear enough about her objective value in the present struggle and our paramount duty to help her. Also he has no fears about Russia in the peace.

In presenting a strategy for victory Fischer presents the usual devices and several somewhat novel ideas. Basic to the war is the blockade, silent and relentless. This together with labor shortage and military losses tends to induce a collapse in Germany. Meanwhile the resistance of the conquered countries, though nowhere decisive, cannot fail of its final effect. He anticipates a growing United Nations air superiority and increasing blows against German production and morale. Highly valuable also is the intention to effect a worthy peace and the broadcasting of such aspects of the war as can be foreseen. The novel ideas he proposes are, first, an industrial general staff which would make all the United Nations' assets available to all in the same way that Lease-Lend now does in a limited way. Finally, he proposes that Europe be invaded not at one point but is generally urged but at many places. This would divert and divide German strength and if any of these bridge-heads

seemed particularly promising that one could be followed up farther.

In his treatment of the problem of the peace Fischer is on the side of the angels. His proposals and his goals warm the heart. While he is aware of the pitfalls and former failures and in this practical sense is cautious, he has not the deeper question about man's possibilities, derived from theology, such as Socialist Christians are apt to possess. In one contention he is eminently right. He urges that stress be placed not on political but economic considerations. Economic maladjustments above all require attention. There will be needed not only regional and local economic plans but, just as definitely, a world plan. He thinks that nations will surrender sovereignty only gradually and that they will want to see success in this limited sphere before they take further steps. The place to begin is in the matter of economic co-operation.

Clifford L. Stanley.

JOHN WOOLMAN, *AMERICAN QUAKER*, by Janet Whitney. (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1942)

"I believe," wrote John Woolman in 1757, "that liberty is the natural right of all men equally . . ." Again he wrote, "He whose will is a law to others and can enforce obedience by punishment; he whose wants are supplied without feeling any obligation to make equal returns to his benefactor, his irregular appetites find an open field for motion and he is in danger of growing hard and inattentive to their convenience who labour for his support and so loses that disposition in which alone men are fit to govern . . ."

Sentences so contemporary in application as these written almost two decades before the Revolutionary War raise the

most basic philosophical and religious questions about progress, human nature, the source of originality in a given individual; the nature of ethics and the perspectives of history.

John Woolman born in New Jersey, October 1720, and deceased in England, in October, 1772, gives striking evidence of man's capacity for greatness amidst the commonplace. How may originality and keenness of insight be explained? How are a sense of moral responsibility, faithful use of all of one's powers, commonsense, a life of prayer and spiritual discipline related to native endowment and childhood conditioning to produce a person who marks his generation?

John Woolman would not have been an easy man to deal with, not because he was insensitive or unkind but because he saw moral values so clearly and acted upon what he saw. Most of us are hypocritical enough to make our fellows comfortable in the discharge of their own hypocracies. For example, the "Essay on Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes" published about 1754 shed a white light of moral penetration upon the Quaker community of Pennsylvania and New Jersey which was most disturbing. It raised the whole issue of ethics in a religion of revelation. The good Overseers, caught off guard by the vigorous and beautiful writing, were nonplussed at the new implications for Quakerism of this attack, not only upon slavery and the economic extremes of rich and poor but also upon current epistemology which gave little place in religious insight to the uses of the intellect. John Woolman insisted upon thought as well as prayer and most uncomfortable of all upon the logic of behavior as an outgrowth of such confrontation by truth as a sound process brought

to light. This explained his eccentric dress, his refusal to eat from silver dishes, to use tobacco or rum, and later to ride in stage coaches, etc. However, his behavior took more socially useful forms than individual eccentricities. His lifelong struggle against Negro slavery, his fight against cruelty to the Indians, against oppression of the economically underprivileged in England and against war, were all carried forward on a plane far above either ascetism or individualism. Perhaps that is the clue to Woolman, that he never denied himself for any reason but the need of other men and his unalterable conviction that these others were his brothers in God. His family lived simply but safely and comfortably, even richly. He exercised that most Christian virtue of commonsense in every decision and relationship. He suffered as keenly as men of less courage and insight might have done over those variations from social behavior to which his conviction drove him. He did not like to forego dyed cloth because Negro slaves made the dyes at great physical hazard to themselves; he did not like to travel steerage nor do so as a spiritual discipline but rather because he must discover the nature of the hold in which sailors and slaves must live; he did not enjoy the embarrassment to himself and his Virginia Quaker hosts when he insisted upon paying his board and lodging because he would not be served by a human slave without recompense. Over these and other details of life he agonized long before acting. But behind these outward symbols was a soundness of view about human solidarity, about the nature of God, of man and of society which was like a seed with no split in it.

In John Woolman one sees that rare person, the man of action who is also the

man of prayer. No charge of separating "personal" and "social" religion could ever be brought against this Quaker. For his life was a unity of gaiety and solemnity; of human and divine; of feeling and believing, of thought and action, of faith and works. Over and over again, lesser men came to him unafraid because for all their awe of him was also their security in his kind and searching singleness of purpose, his achieved integrity.

Throughout Woolman's life a sinister minor key sounded mystery and combat in his ears. Smallpox, one of the most awful plagues, robbed him of many of those dearest to him and finally took his own life. He had enough prophetic sense both of medicine and of theology, as it was to be understood later on, to feel sure that God was not dependent upon smallpox for the exercise of His wisdom and grace.

For the year 1942, when moral struggle, war, and the oppression of minorities are issues as terrifying as ever before in history, the biography and the Journal of John Woolman, Christian, has peculiar relevance. While this particular volume does not reveal unusual literary merit, yet the author is not unaware of the historical realities with which she is dealing and serves to portray with considerable power an American citizen for which this country and all Christians may be endlessly grateful.

Winnifred Wygal.

THE ROOTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, by Rohan D'O. Butler. Dutton, New York. 1942. \$3.00.

This book is written against the background of a conviction that the Nazi movement is the most decisive and inescapable fact of the time. Furthermore, the National Socialist movement is re-

garded as inexpressibly malignant. This conviction of the evil of Nazism is the unstated major premise of the whole argument, shared by writer and reader alike. Readers of this journal will agree that Nazism is an evil, but they will not be prepared to say that it is only an evil. Pure evil is a theological abstraction and cannot be the quality of any constituent of history. In the present case the Nazis have solved the problem of the machine age, surely a good thing, but at too great a cost in human values. Again post-war Austria was a political impossibility and needed to be united with Germany (or some other country) or at least to have a customs union with Germany. The Nazis effected this necessary result though admittedly at the too great cost of destroying the spirit of Austria. In addition, all men agree that Europe needs unification, though most of them did not anticipate the rigors of the New Order. To mention another thing, we must consider the Nazi movement to be a justified, though too extreme, reaction in the direction of nationalism and appreciation of history from modern individualism and lack of understanding of the role of nations. Finally it is an extreme but inevitable reaction in the direction of the organic side of life from the arid mechanization of life in modern theory and practice. For these reasons we cannot agree that Nazism is simply bad. Yet when all is said we must regard it as a wicked thing.

A natural question and the chief subject of this book is the query, where did National Socialism come from? The author maintains the thesis that Nazism is simply the last term of the main development of German thought. He does this after acknowledging that creative figures and the immediate political situ-

ation also played a part. He also admits other elements in German thought but denies their centrality. Besides, he admits that for most of the time while this tradition was developing most Germans were unaware of it. Lastly he admits the occurrence of many of the elements of the German thought tradition in other lands. But his answer to all this is two-fold. First, certain themes appear so frequently and with such continuity that they constitute a definite corpus of thought. He names fifteen of these (pp. 276-7)—the heroic leader, the racial myth, anti-semitism, the totalitarian state, the ruling elite, the community of the folk, economic autarchy, national type of socialism, militarism, dynamic originality of German culture in contrast to the artificial civilization of the west, polemic against reason, supernational mission of German culture, living space, Pan-Germanism, Law as folk law, abasement of the individual before the state, might is right. His second contention is that the German thinkers imparted to this traditional material a spirit—Germanism—which resulted in making it the intellectual expression of the German soul.

Are we to allow the judgment of the author that Nazism is the natural fruit of German development? The evidence is complete and overpowering. The writer even adds that he has made only a selection from the mass of material, choosing the leaders and omitting the numerous followers. I think we will have to admit that he has made his case. Nazism is a very German thing. Not only is it a possibility of the German spirit but it is a very probable possibility at that. It is only what we might have expected.

This view will arouse resentment only if Nazism is written off as a simple evil.

But it is not. In some sense it is not evil but only different from our values, only the climax of a difference that has been present all along. In a measure Germany is different only in the sense that one nation differs from another. But beyond this there is a genuine cleavage from the West. I am not prepared to say whether this roots in the long time historical development of the people or whether, as Butler holds, it is due to the influence of Prussia over modern Germany, a Prussian itself influenced by the Slavic genius. I think we ought to recognize that a rift has appeared between Germany and the West and that this did not spring into existence overnight. For sometime more and more Germans have become more vociferous and self-conscious about it. There is no reason why there should not be such a rift. The West is not the repository of all values. If there be such a cleavage, the history of our part of the world will come to be regarded not as a homogeneous movement but as a collaboration, where that is possible, between divergent traditions and a struggle when cooperation is not possible. Again, just as we resent attempts at 'coordination' by others we will have to give over such attempts as we have made to swing Germany completely into the West. We cannot live well if we disregard great features of the historical landscape.

National Socialism is not only the natural fruit of the German spirit but it is also the madness of the German people. It is this in two senses. In the first place the furious leaders of the movement have taken advantage of Germany's hour of weakness to bewitch her. In this sense, Germany is to be regarded as innocent apart from the present regime. But regardless of the innocent

past, the people did accept, believe, and follow the Nazi criminals. Thus as Hans Simons points out, they must be defeated in a military sense before they can be saved from this madness. There is a second sense in which the Nazi movement is the madness of Germany. It is the dangerous climax of a dangerous line of thought too long indulged in Germany. That which was only one strand became the chief, and finally the only strand. In subordination and in concert with other traditions its evil could be endured. But when this tradition stands alone and is carried to its logical development it becomes a terrible evil. Every madness is the lawless victory of some peculiarity previously present in the mind. I line with this, Nazism may be considered Germany's own way of madly holding characteristic German ideas. In this sense the madness is also damnation, the day when Mephistopheles settles his account. This madness is deeper than the other and is not dealt with by a simple change of the regime.

Finally Nazism may be regarded as a judgment upon the whole modern period and particularly upon the West. It is this, first, as an extreme reaction from modern extremes. Take, for instance, the individualism of modern times, an individualism whose complement is universalism. This is all very well but it tends to regard the nation as a mere artificial construct. Since the nation is the bearer of history such a view is anti-historical. But, since nations and history are permanent aspects of human life such a view is an extreme. It is an extreme which a Germany struggling to be born could less afford than, say, England and France with their achieved nationhood. So Germany, previous to the time of the Nazis and since, set out to redress the

balance. But Nazism is a judgment on the modern age in a second way. The modern period is based on the religious achievement of Christianity which culminated in the Middle Ages. But it misunderstood this fact and rejected its religious basis. The period has been increasingly secular. Theoretically there is an end term to the process which completes it and for that very reason sets up a new series. Nazism is the rebirth of open and unashamed paganism. In a sense it represents a peculiarly German exhuming of the old Teutonic gods. More deeply, however, it is the nemesis of paganism upon the spiritual vacuum of secularism. It represents the abyss to which we all are drifting. Therefore, it is not enough to externalize Nazi paganism in Germany alone and imagine that we need to slay it only outside ourselves.

Clifford L. Stanley.

GREY EMINENCE, by *Aldous Huxley*
Harper Brothers. \$3.50.

Aldous Huxley's biography of Father Joseph, the high hand man of Cardinal Richelieu, represents a further elaboration of Huxley's answer to the problem of life in terms of mysticism. Father Joseph was a saintly mystic who was diverted from the purity of his vision by his sense of duty toward the divine mission of France.

Huxley sees the ultimate problem of human spirituality clearly enough. He sees that each level of moral and spiritual achievement has its corresponding temptation, that "the intelligence, the sensibility, the spirituality of Satan is always exactly proportionate to the intelligence, sensibility and spirituality of the individual in whom he is at work." In other words Father Joseph, the saintly mystic was tempted into unscrupulous politics,

when he moved from vision to action, precisely because he identified the God of his pure vision too uncritically with the mission and destiny of France.

The proper conclusion to be drawn from this object lesson would be that mysticism is an inadequate religion for the discipline of human action. Either the mystic can not act at all, lest he become impure in his action; or he persuades himself that the relative historical cause to which he is devoted is identical with the God whom he has worshiped in mystic visions.

Huxley, like all perfectionists, is unable to see the inevitability of this conflict between vision and action. He does not recognize that all human action is in its very nature impure. He, therefore, busies himself with a scheme for the development of a new kind of politics which he defines as "goodness politics" and with which he will supplant "power politics."

"Goodness politics" turns out to be no more than a plan of decentralizing government. It is "the art of organizing on a large scale without sacrificing the ethical values which emerge only among individuals and small groups . . . of combining decentralization of government and industry, local and functional autonomy and smallness of administrative units with enough overall efficiency to guarantee the smooth running of the federated whole."

Whatever the pragmatic values of decentralization and however great the perils of centralized power, it is rather fatuous to solve a basic problem of human existence by the simple device of decentralizing power. Has Mr. Huxley never heard of saints who lost their purity, not because they became accomplices of a French statesman but because they were elected abbot of their monastery? Or does he imagine that it is simple for a father of a family to overcome the temptation to regard his authority in the family as identical with God's authority, or to equate the welfare of his family with the final good?

R. N.

WILL GERMANY CRACK? *By Paul Hagen*, Harper Brothers. \$3.00.

The research director of the American Friends of German Freedom who was for years the leader of an underground movement in Germany has, in this volume, made the most authoritative analysis of the economic and social conditions in Germany. The book is documented with a tremendous amount of factual material. Hagen is a profound and sober analyst who does less wishful thinking than any known emigre.

The chapters in which he analyses the relation between the Nazi party and the army, and estimates the possibilities of conflict between the two are particularly able.

R. N.